जीवन्मुक्तभारती

(Sacred Words of a Liberated Sage)

शृङ्गेरी जगद्गुरु
श्रीचन्द्रशेखरभारतीमहास्वामिनः

His Holiness
Sri Chandrasekhara Bharathi Mahaswamigal,
the 34th Jagadguru of Sri Sringeri Sharada Peetham

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Sri Jagadguru Shankaracharya Mahasamsthanam
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श्री श्री जगद्गुरु शङ्कराचार्य महासंस्थानम्, दक्षिणाम्नाय श्री शारदापीठम्, शृङ्गेरी

दक्षिणाम्नाय शृङ्गगिरिशारदापीठाधीश्वराणां जगद्गुरु शङ्कराचार्याणां अनन्तश्रीविभूषितानां श्रीश्रीभारतीतीर्थमहास्वामिनामनुग्रहसन्देशः

अस्मत्परमगुरुचरणाः प्रातःस्मरणीयाः जगद्गुरु श्रीचन्द्रशेखरभारतीमहास्वामिनः सर्वेष्वपि दर्शनेषु अप्रतिमप्रतिभाशालिनो व्यराजन्त। ते विद्यार्थिदशायामेव विदुषामपि दुष्पूरां समस्यां लीलयैव सम्पूर्य गुरुवर्याणां निरवग्रहानुग्रहपात्रतामभजन्त। भगवत्पादीयप्रस्थानत्रय भाष्याब्धिं चुलुकीकृतवतां तेषां तद्भाष्यविवरणसरणिरसाधारणी बभूवेति तेभ्य एवाधिगतभाष्याणां अस्मद्गुरुचरणानां मुखादश्रौष्म। विवेकचूडामणेस्तदीया व्याख्या तेषां प्रतिभायाः दर्पणायते। ते कदाचित् ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्यं व्याख्याय लोकानुपकर्तुमैहिषत। अध्यासभाष्ये कञ्चन भागं व्याचचक्षिरे च। परन्तु गच्छता कालेन निदिध्यासनरतानां तेषां चेतः नान्यत्र क्वापि व्याप्रियते स्म। अत एवेयं व्याख्या स्तोकैव समुपलभ्यते। परन्तु धूर्जटिशिरसि वर्तमाना लोकानाह्लादयन्ती शीतांशोः कलेव इयमपि व्याख्या लघुकायापि सतां मनांसि रञ्जयिष्यत्येवेति विस्रम्भो दृढो नः। जीवन्मुक्तानामेकं वचोऽपि श्रेयःप्रतिपादनायालं भवति। अत एवास्याः कृतेः जीवन्मुक्तभारतीति नामाऽपि सार्थकं वरीवर्ति।

श्रीशारदाशशिकलावतंसयोरसीमया कृपया ग्रन्थोऽयं सहृदयहृदयाह्लादको विशिष्टं प्रचारमेत्वित्याशास्महे।

शृङ्गगिरिः
तारणमाघपूर्णिमा
गुरुवासरः 24.2.2005

इति नारायणस्मरणम्
भारतीतीर्थः

His Holiness Jagadguru Sri Bharathi Theertha Mahaswamigal
at the Shrine of
His Holiness Jagadguru Sri Chandrasekhara Bharathi Mahaswamigal

Translation of the benedictory message of His Holiness Jagadguru Shankaracharya Sri Sri Bharathi Theertha Mahaswamigal, the pontiff of the Dakshinamnaya Sringeri Sharada Peetham.

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Our revered *Paramaguru*, His Holiness Jagadguru Sri Chandrasekhara Bharathi Mahawamigal, whose name ought to be recalled at the start of every day, had unmatched mastery over all the *darśana*-s. Even when a student, He effortlessly completed a partially given verse that even scholars were unable to finish and received the unbounded grace of His esteemed *Guru*. He thoroughly assimilated Bhagavatpāda's *bhāṣya*-s on the *Upaniṣad*-s, *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Brahmasūtra*-s. We have directly heard from Our venerable *Guru*, who had learnt the *bhāṣya*-s from Him, that His mode of exposition of the *bhāṣya*-s was extraordinary. His commentary on the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* testifies to His brilliance.

He once wished to help people by penning an elucidation of the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* and proceeded to expatiate on a portion of the *Adhyāsabhāṣya* thereof. However, with the passage of time, His mind, which revelled in mediating upon the Truth, ceased to engage in anything but such meditation. Hence, only a little of the proposed commentary is available to us. Nevertheless, like the digit of the moon on the crest of Lord Śiva which pleases people, this exposition, though small in extent, will indeed delight the noble. This is our firm conviction. Even a single word of a *jīvanmukta* (one who is liberated while alive) is enough to make known the highest good. Hence, the title '*Jīvanmuktabhāratī* (Sacred Words of a Liberated Sage)' that has been assigned to this work is significant.

We bless that this book, which can make the good-hearted rejoice, become widely read by the limitless grace of Goddess *Śāradā* and Lord *Candramoulīśvara*.

With the remembrance of Lord Nārāyaṇa,

(S/d) Bharathi Theertha

Sringeri
Tāraṇa-māgha-pūrṇimā
Thursday; 24.2.2005

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॥ श्रीचन्द्रशेखरभारतीनवरत्नमालिका ॥

(शृङ्गेरीजगद्गुरुश्रीश्रीभारतीतीर्थमहास्वामिविरचिता)

श्रीमच्चन्द्रिरशेखरभारत्यभिधानमाश्रये यमिनम् ।
निरवधिसंसृतिनीरधिमग्नजनोद्धरणबद्धदीक्षं तम् ॥ १ ॥

काषायाम्बरपरिवृतमीषत्स्मितवदनमिष्टदातारम् ।
शेषाख्येयगुणालिं भूषायितशमदमादिकं वन्दे ॥ २ ॥

गाङ्गझरीसमवाचं स्वाङ्गत्विण्णिर्जिताच्छगाङ्गेयम् ।
माङ्गलिकमाश्रयेऽहं जाङ्गलिकं भवमहाविषस्येशम् ॥ ३ ॥

करुणामृतसरिदीशं गुरुणाऽपि स्तुत्यमतुलधीयुक्तम् ।
तरुणारुणवदनाब्जं च नृणां गम्यं तमाश्रये सततम् ॥ ४ ॥

अतिवेलमधुरभाषितमतितरलस्वान्तमखिलवन्द्यपदम् ।
यतिवर्यं हृदि कलये मतिमान्द्यस्यापनुत्तये सततम् ॥ ५ ॥

पालितनिजभक्तततिं शीलितवेदान्तगूढतत्त्वं तम् ।
मीलितलोचनयुगलं लालितभुवनत्रयं नमामि सदा ॥ ६ ॥

राकाशशिनिभवक्त्रं पाकारिप्रमुखकीर्त्यचारित्रम् ।
आकाशकेशभक्तं शोकापहमाश्रये गुरूत्तंसम् ॥ ७ ॥

तापारण्यकृशानुं भूपालकवन्दनीयपदयुगलम् ।
पापापहनामानं शापानुग्रहसमर्थमहमीडे ॥ ८ ॥

शङ्करदेशिकविरचितपीठाधिपमालिकामहारत्नम् ।
प्रणमामि चन्द्रशेखरभारत्यभिधानदेशिकं हृदये ॥ ९ ॥

Translation of
Śrīcandraśekharabhāratīnavaratnamālikā

A Bejewelled Garland of Nine Verses on Jagadguru Sri Chandrasekhara Bharathi Mahaswamigal

An offering of the Sringeri Jagadguru His Holiness Bharathi Theertha Mahaswamigal

(1) I seek refuge in Jagadguru Sri Chandrasekhara Bharathi Mahaswamigal, an ascetic committed to rescuing the people drowning in the ocean of phenomenal existence.

(2) I pay obeisance to Him, whose attire is ochreous, who has a gentle smile on His face, who bestows all that is wished for, whose ornaments are traits like control of the mind and restraint of the senses and whose host of noble qualities can be reckoned only by Ādiśeṣa with a thousand mouths.

(3) I resort to Him, the auspicious Lord, whose body is more lustrous than gold, whose speech resembles the flow of the Ganges and who nullifies the terrible poison of transmigratory existence.

(4) I ever take shelter in Him, who is an ocean of mercy, who is worthy of even My *Guru*'s praise, who has an unmatched intellect, whose face is like the rising sun and who is accessible to all people.

(5) For the removal of mental dullness, I constantly hold in My heart the foremost *saṁnyāsin*, whose intellect is most splendid, whose speech is exceedingly sweet and whose feet ought to be saluted by all.

(6) I always offer prostrations to Him, who takes care of His numerous devotees, who is versed in the profound essence of

Vedānta, whose gaze is indrawn and who is benevolent to the three worlds.

(7) I take refuge in the best of *Guru*-s, who eradicates sorrows, whose face is beautiful like the full moon, who is devoted to Lord Śiva and whose conduct is commendable even to the celestials headed by Indra.

(8) I extol Him, the very utterance of whose name destroys sins, who has the power to curse and to shower grace, who is a fire that burns up the forest of afflictions and whose pair of feet is saluted even by kings.

(9) In My heart, I offer reverential prostration to Jagadguru Sri Chandrasekhara Bharathi Mahaswamigal, a great gem in the garland of pontiffs of the Sringeri Sharada Peetham founded by Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda.

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His Holiness Jagadguru
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His Guru H.H. Jagadguru Sri Chandrasekhara Bharathi Mahaswamigal

H.H. Jagadguru
Sri Chandrasekhara Bharathi Mahaswamigal

[*The following account is fully based on some discourses in Kannada and Tamil by H.H. Jagadguru Sri Abhinava Vidyatheertha Mahaswamigal on His Guru, His benedictory prefaces to books and His compositions on His Guru. The compositions are culled from His letters to His Guru penned in the period 1936-39. One verse was composed by Him in 1954 following the disembodied liberation of His Guru.*]

श्रीचन्द्रशेखरभारतीतिप्रथितप्रातस्स्मरणीयनामधेया अस्मदाचार्यपादाः
कृततपश्चर्याः सर्वतन्त्रस्वतन्त्राः शास्त्रोपदिष्टार्थानुष्ठाननिष्ठागरिष्ठा
अपरोक्षीकृतात्मतत्त्वा जीवन्मुक्ता अभूवन् ।

(Foreword to *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* with the commentary of H.H. Jagadguru Sri Chandrasekhara Bharathi Mahaswamigal)

(Our revered preceptor, Jagadguru Sri Chandrasekhara Bharathi Mahaswamigal, whose name ought to be respectfully recalled at the start of every day, had accomplished penance, was beyond the confines of all schools of thought, was an adept at the performance of what is prescribed in the scriptures, had directly realised the Reality that is the *Ātman* and was a *jīvanmukta* (one liberated even while living).)

अस्मदाचार्यपादा ब्रह्मनिष्ठा ब्रह्मपरा जीवन्मुक्ताः
समस्तानामास्तिकानामादर्शचरिता अभूवन् ।

(Benedictory Preface to *Śrījagadgurucaritāmṛta* by Bhashya Swamigal)

(Our revered preceptor was ever focused on Brahman, held Brahman as the ultimate and was a *jīvanmukta*; His life was an ideal for all *āstika*-s.)

सदाऽऽत्मध्याननिरतं विषयेभ्यः पराङ्मुखम् ।
नौमि शास्त्रेषु निष्णातं चन्द्रशेखरभारतीम् ॥ (Composed in 1954)

(I extol Jagadguru Sri Chandrasekhara Bharathi Mahaswamigal, who is ever immersed in the contemplation of the *Ātman*, is withdrawn from sense-objects and is well versed in the *śāstra*-s.)

अविद्याध्वान्तानां दिनमणिरनन्तान्तरगतो
विषीदद्विद्वद्धृत्कुमुदवनराकाहिमकरः ।
पराध्वामित्राणां विषयगहनानां हुतवहो
गुरुस्तेजोरूपो जयति जनताऽऽनन्दथुरयम् ॥

(To those in the darkness of ignorance, he is the sun that is infinite as also within. To the multitude of drooping lilies that are the hearts of scholars, he is the moon. To those trapped in the forest of sense-objects and without a friend in the path to the Supreme, he is the flaming torch that lights the way. Victorious is the luminous *Guru* who confers joy on all.)

वन्दे वन्दारुमन्दारं वन्दनीयं बुधोत्तमैः ।
आनन्दकन्दलं तीर्थवारिधिं देशिकोत्तमम् ॥

(I prostrate before the greatest *Guru*, who is a *kalpavṛkṣa* (wish-fulfilling tree) to those who bow, who is worthy of being saluted by pre-eminent knowers of the Truth, who is the fresh sprout of bliss and who is the ocean of the *śāstra*-s (or, in other words, is fully conversant with the *śāstra*-s).)

My *Guru* was a knower of Brahman and was not dependent on any effect or cause. He was ever absorbed in Brahman and looked upon the world as a dream. He was quite literally a *paramahaṁsa*. He did not have the slightest desire for anything whatsoever in the entire realm of phenomenal existence. He was thoroughly detached even with regard to His body.

It is said that a *saṁnyāsin* should not touch any valuable with desire. As for My *Guru*, He not only did not keep with Himself anything presented to Him, He did not so much as touch it, even without desire. He said, "Were I to touch anything of worldly

value made available to Me, somebody may wonder whether this *saṁnyāsin* felt any wish for it. Why should I unnecessarily cause such a disturbance in anyone's mind?" Not once did He visit the Math vault and see the precious objects there. He did not even peruse the book listing the items stored there. He never asked about the celebrations in the Math. When the officials informed Him, He listened in silence. Only if He was told that His presence was needed for a function, He took part in it. His detachment was so intense that though He was the pontiff of a big Math, He did not even have the idea that He lived there.

करतलभिक्षस्तरुतलवासः (*Mohamudgara* 16c)

(He receives food as alms in his palms and lives at the bases of trees.)

It was with this mental attitude that He abided in the Math.

Though absolutely dispassionate towards all worldly and heavenly enjoyments, He had limitless motherly love towards every one of His disciples. Whenever He went to a temple, He unfailingly prayed to the Lord for the well-being of all and for their acquiring enlightenment and liberation.

When it came to religious practices and activities relating to the welfare of the devotees, He acted in accordance with the following words of the *Bhagavadgītā*:

न मे पार्थास्ति कर्तव्यं त्रिषु लोकेषु किञ्चन ।

नानवाप्तमवाप्तव्यं वर्त एव च कर्मणि ॥ (III.22)

(O Pārtha, there is nothing in the three worlds that I must do; nor is there anything to be attained that has not been attained. Yet, I engage in actions.)

यदि ह्यहं न वर्तेयं जातु कर्मण्यतन्द्रितः ।

मम वर्त्मानुवर्तन्ते मनुष्याः पार्थ सर्वशः ॥ (III.23)

उत्सीदेयुरिमे लोका न कुर्यां कर्म चेदहम् । (III.24ab)

(O Pārtha, if I do not, without laziness, ever engage in action, men would, in all matters, follow My path. These worlds would be ruined if I did not perform action.)

Keeping others in mind, He opined, “You have all labelled Me a great pontiff. Regardless of whether or not I should perform worship and obtain the fruit thereof, if I were to abstain from worship, you would think, ‘Even Swamigal does not perform any worship. Why should we engage in what He Himself is not interested in carrying out?’ Therefore, I must perform worship. You people will then act likewise, thinking, ‘The great one Himself engages in worship. It may or may not be necessary for Him but we need it. So, we must carry it out.’” That My *Guru* was a *Mahātman* (great soul) has been known by experience by those who were His contemporaries and beheld Him.

The Lord has said that a person who strives for perfection but dies before realising the Truth takes a birth wherein:
पूर्वाभ्यासेन तेनैव ह्रियते ह्यवशोऽपि सः ॥ (*Bhagavadgītā* VI.44ab)
(By that very former practice, he is carried forward, even forcibly.)
When the accumulated good tendencies of numerous previous lives bear fruit in a person in a particular life, that person becomes a *mahāpuruṣa*. Such was the case of My *Guru*. His introversion did not stem subsequent to His taking *saṁnyāsa*, studying the *śāstra*-s and practising spiritual disciplines. It manifested right from His childhood. The following two incidents illustrate this.

As a boy, He used to go to the market to make purchases for His parents. He was neither interested in seeing things in the shops and the street nor did He have the money to purchase more than what was essential. While setting out, He used to mentally chant the *Mūkapañcaśatī* (Five hundred verses on Goddess Kāmākṣī by Mūka-kavi). It even happened that He became so absorbed in the verses and their import that He forgot His surroundings and the purpose of His setting out. By the time He realised where He was, He was outside the limits of Sringeri.

On every *pradoṣa*, He used to sit in the evening at the base of a pillar in the Vidyāśaṅkara temple in the Math and perform

mental worship of Lord Śiva as described in the *Śivamānasapūjā-stotra* and the *Mṛtyuñjayamānasapūjā-stotra*. With an unwavering mind, He used to mentally contemplate on the Lord, invoke Him, offer Him a seat, worship His feet and, duly, go on to feeding the Lord, performing *ārati* to Him and doing *namaskāra*.

My *Guru* had the practice, since His youth, of performing the *pārāyaṇa* (recital) of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. A verse to be chanted prior to the reading is:

यत्र यत्र रघुनाथकीर्तनं तत्र तत्र कृतमस्तकाञ्जलिम् ।

बाष्पवारिपरिपूर्णलोचनं मारुतिं नमत राक्षसान्तकम् ॥

(Salute Hanumān, the destroyer of ogres, who remains with His palms joined above His head and with His eyes brimming with tears of joy wherever there is the glorification of Rāma.)
All of us have read this verse about Hanumān and know its meaning. Still, we hardly believe that Hanumān comes at the start of our recital and leaves on its completion. On the other hand, the position of My *Guru* was unique. He reflected, "It is improper that Hanumān should sit on the ground and listen while we sit on a wooden plank and read. He should be offered respect and a seat to occupy." Having thought thus, My *Guru* decided, "As I myself sit on a wooden plank, I should place one for Him." Accordingly, My *Guru* used to place a wooden plank for Hanumān to occupy and then did *Rāmāyaṇa-pārāyaṇa*, with the feeling that Hanumān was seated there. What faith He had!

He was intensely devoted to Jagadguru Sri Sacchidananda Sivabhinava Nrisimha Bharathi Mahaswamigal, My *Paramaguru*. His longing when He was a boy was, "How wonderful it would be if I could somehow have the *Guru*'s *pādukā*-s in My house and worship them!" If we have faith and devotion and God is merciful to us, then what we wish automatically becomes fulfilled. Likewise, by virtue of His faith, My *Guru* obtained the *pādukā*-s. An aged person visited Sringeri and, in response to his request, My *Paramaguru* graced him with

His sacred *pāduka*-s. When leaving Sringeri, the person failed to take with him the *pāduka*-s that he had kept at the residence of My *Guru*. He did not return to collect them. As his address was not available, they could not be sent to him either. My *Guru* thought, "It is by the great grace of God and the *Guru* that I have received these *pāduka*-s. Worshipping them constitutes for Me the means to attain the highest end." From then on, He dedicatedly worshipped them every day.

As a *brahmacārin*, My *Guru* got the opportunity to learn Sanskrit as a student of the Math *pāṭhaśālā*. If anything was taught to Him once, it was sufficient; He grasped it. If He heard anything once, He could recall it accurately. In those days, books were hard to come by in Sringeri. My *Guru* copied down, in excellent handwriting, the contents of several books. There is a Sanskrit book called *Dhāturūpamañjarī*. His copy of it looks just like a printed book. I have this copy with Me. It has the same number of letters per page as the printed book. He studied with great sincerity. He made it a point to secure a double promotion every year. After reaching the fourth class of the Math's *pāṭhaśālā*, apart from studying, He began to teach students of the lower classes. His teacher used to tell Him, "You must take classes. You teach well."

My *Guru* used to retain in His mind, with great faith, every word that He heard His *Guru* speak. Once, before starting on a tour, My *Paramaguru* told the assembled Pundits to complete, by the time He returned, a verse whose fourth quarter should be:

मुद्रा काचन मुक्तिदाननिपुणा निद्राति जागर्ति वा

(There is some Being who is proficient in conferring liberation.
Is that Being asleep or awake?)

My *Guru*, who heard these words, promptly memorised them. He subsequently composed the rest of the verse. At the close of His long tour, My *Paramaguru* asked whether anyone had prepared a verse ending with the words that He had given. None except My *Guru* had successfully done so. When someone mentioned that

My *Guru* had penned a verse, My *Paramaguru* asked Him to read it. My *Guru*'s composition was:

क्षोणीभृद्वरसानुवर्तिवटवृक्षाधःप्रदेशस्थिता

मुद्रापुस्तकमौनयुक् शमयुता नासाग्रदृष्टिस्सदा ।

पाराशर्यसुतादिमान्मुनिवरान्सम्बोधयन्ती परं

मुद्रा काचन मुक्तिदाननिपुणा निद्राति जागर्ति वा ॥

(At the base of a big banyan tree on a peak of the Himalayas is seated a Being (Lord Śiva in the form of the Dakṣiṇāmūrti, the *Guru*) whose eyes are steadily directed to the tip of the nose, who is silent and mentally tranquil and who holds a book in one hand and displays in another the *cinmudrā* (the sign of knowledge in which the tips of the thumb and the index finger are in contact and the other fingers are straight). He enlightens the foremost sages such as Śuka about the Supreme Brahman. Is this Being, who is proficient in conferring liberation, awake or asleep?)

Some do sleep with their eyelids slightly open. Lord Dakṣiṇāmūrti's eyes are three-fourths closed and He is totally motionless. Thus, it seems that He is asleep. However, purely by His grace, He bestows on sages such as Śuka the knowledge of the Truth. Each of His disciples avers, "On my coming to Your presence, all my doubts have become cleared. I have received instruction culminating in the realisation of Brahman." If Dakṣiṇāmūrti is to impart knowledge, He must be awake. Therefore, it is unclear whether this Being is asleep or awake.

My *Paramaguru* felt extremely pleased with My *Guru* for what He had done. My *Guru* was deeply devoted to Lord Śiva in the form of Dakṣiṇāmūrti and had accordingly completed the verse. My *Paramaguru* too was particularly devoted to Śiva and had personally wanted to complete the verse so as to refer to Śiva. However, the words that had occurred to Him had resulted in His completing the verse in terms of Lord Viṣṇu lying on Ādiśeṣa in the ocean of milk. Hence, He was slightly dissatisfied with His composition. He felt particularly glad that My *Guru* had done

what He Himself had wanted to do. He blessed My *Guru* with a glance replete with the power of grace.

While on tour, My *Paramaguru* used to send for the answer-papers of the students of the *pāṭhaśālā*, peruse them and determine the competence of the students. On reading My *Guru*'s answer-papers, He formed the impression, "He is highly intelligent." During His final tour, My *Paramaguru* decided to start an excellent educational institution at Bangalore. He named it '*Bhāratīya Gīrvāṇa Prouḍha Vidyābhivardhinī Pāṭhaśālā*' and appointed Pundits versed in Vedānta and Pūrvamīmāṁsā to teach the students. For the first batch there, He selected those students studying in Sringeri who were highly intelligent. My *Guru* was one of those chosen by Him. Prior to sending Him to Bangalore, My *Paramaguru* initiated Him into a *mahāmantra*. He then told Him, "For You and for those whom You will teach, this shall constitute a means of earning God's grace."

Before My *Guru* departed, My *Paramaguru* advised Him, "You are engaged in studies. It must not be for the sake of subsequently earning money. It should be for the sake of acquiring knowledge. The ultimate knowledge is the realisation of the *Ātman*. That should accrue to You. That is why I am sending You for the advanced study of the *śāstra*-s. To acquire the realisation of the *Ātman*, hearing the Truth from a *Guru*, reflecting on what is taught and absorption of the mind on the Truth are very essential. However, for the hearing and reflection to bear fruit, the mind must be pure. For the mind to become pure, it is necessary to carry out properly the practices ordained by the scripture. The Pūrvamīmāṁsā-śāstra is highly helpful in enabling one to understand the scriptural actions. Therefore, first study the Pūrvamīmāṁsā-śāstra well as a student at Bangalore."

Accordingly, My *Guru* spent long hours studying the Mīmāṁsā books such as the *Bhāṭṭa-dīpikā*. He was taught by Vaidyanatha Sastry, a *Mīmāṁsaka-śiromaṇi* (crest-jewel amongst those versed in Mīmāṁsā).

My *Guru* was destined to become a *saṁnyāsin*. One day, Markandeya Brahmachari, Sivananda and My *Guru* (who was then a *brahmacārin*) went for reverentially beholding their *Guru*. He asked them to accompany Him to the Kālabhairava temple. When seated in the temple, He looked at My *Guru*'s face and chanted three verses.

संसारनामकसरिन्नाथोत्तरणे तवास्ति यदि वाञ्छा ।
बालक शृणु मद्वचनं श्रुतिमस्तकसंमतं हितोदर्कम् ॥
प्रविधाय सशिखवपनं छित्त्वा यज्ञार्थमादृतं सूत्रम् ।
स्वीकृतपारमहंस्यः स्थिरतरसाधनचतुष्टयोपेतः ॥
श्रद्धाभक्तियुतात्मा प्रविचारय तत्त्वमात्मनः सुचिरम् ।
सद्गुरुमुखाम्बुजातस्रवदागमशीर्षवाक्यपीयूषैः ॥

(O child! If you have the desire to cross the ocean of transmigratory existence then listen to my utterance, which is in consonance with the *Upaniṣad*-s and is beneficial. Having shaven your head together with the tuft and having broken the sacred thread donned for performing sacrifices, take up *paramahaṁsa-saṁnyāsa*. Very firmly possessed of the four spiritual means and with a mind endowed with faith and devotion, enquire for long about the Truth by means of the nectar-like utterances of the *Upaniṣad*-s flowing from the lotus-mouth of the *Sadguru*.)

Though My *Paramaguru* did not tell My *Guru* about His wanting to give Him *saṁnyāsa* or of His wanting to choose Him as His successor, He chanted these verses containing valuable advice while looking at My *Guru*'s face. He thereby brought about ripeness in My *Guru*'s mind.

When My *Paramaguru* felt that His body had served its purpose, He sent word for My *Guru*, who was at Bangalore. He made the resolve, "I shall give *saṁnyāsa* to Him." My *Guru* asked no questions. "My *Guru* has commanded Me to come to Sringeri. Hence, I must go" - this was all that He felt. "What about My parents? What will be My future?" - no such thoughts arose in His mind. On the way to Sringeri, He learnt that His

Guru had shed the body. Someone else in the place of My *Guru* might have felt, "He in response to whose command I am being taken is Himself not there. What is the necessity now to proceed to Sringeri for *saṁnyāsa*?" However, My *Guru* had no such thoughts about carrying out the directive of His *Guru*. His mind was as undisturbed as that of a *yogin* in *samādhi*.

My *Guru* did not have the opportunity to be initiated into *saṁnyāsa* through the actual touch of His *Guru*'s hand. However, there is *mānasa-dīkṣā*, or initiation of a disciple by the *Guru* through just the mind. Bhagavatpāda imparted the 14 *vidyā*-s to His disciple, Giri, just by the thought, "Let him get this knowledge." If the *Guru* does have the power to so bless and does so, *śakti* descends on the disciple from the *Guru* and the disciple obtains knowledge. My *Paramaguru* had indeed made the resolve to impart *saṁnyāsa* to My *Guru* and make Him His successor in the Peetham.

After becoming a *saṁnyāsin,* My *Guru* arranged for the foremost of Nyāya scholars, Virupaksha Sastry, to take lessons for Him. He learnt Advaita-vedānta in the mornings and the Nyāya-śāstra in the afternoons. He completed His studies of both the *śāstra*-s in just three years. In the line of pontiffs of the Sringeri Math, there flowed a torrent of knowledge and austerity and He added to it.

Such was the faith of My *Guru* in Bhagavatpāda that He held that the condition of being a *deva* is but ordinary, while that of being a human is what is excellent. This, He averred, must be the case for Bhagavatpāda has said:

दुर्लभं त्रयमेवैतद्दैवानुग्रहहेतुकम् ।
मनुष्यत्वं मुमुक्षुत्वं महापुरुषसंश्रयः ॥ (*Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* 3)

(These three are difficult to obtain and are the consequence of the grace of God: the condition of being a human, the desire for liberation and the dedicated worship of a great person.)

My *Guru* clarified that the *deva*-s are hardly in a position to acquire the liberating knowledge of the *Ātman*, for many are their enjoyments. Their pleasures preclude dispassion, which is needed for enlightenment. With celestial nymphs like Ūrvaśī and Rambhā to entertain him, with heavenly objects to enjoy and with the kingship of heaven, Indra himself has almost no occasion to cultivate dispassion and become enlightened. On the other hand, with diseases threatening to disrupt pleasures and with the risk of ignominy ruining familial reputation, conditions are highly favourable for humans to become dispassionate. Thus, in the light of the verse of Bhagavatpāda, the condition of being a human is superior to that of being a *deva*.

My *Guru* had the conviction that every single word of Bhagavatpāda is immaculate and significant. Bhagavatpāda has written in *Śataślokī*, "*svaṁ bālaṁ rodamānam*." An objection is, "The term '*rodamānam*' is incorrect. The verbal root '*rud*' from which it stems is *parasmaipadī* and so the correct form is '*rudantam*'. The term '*rodamanam*' would have been appropriate only if the root were *atmanepadī*." My *Guru* responded, "There is no fault whatsoever in Bhagavatpāda's usage. This is because the term '*rodamānam*' is not a present participle, as wrongly assumed in the objection. On the other hand, it is a compound word that means 'him whose evidence (*mānam* = *pramāṇam*) lies in crying (*rode* = *rodane*)'. This flawless compound is an adjective qualifying '*bālam*', child. It conveys that the child is a cry-baby."

In this fashion, He took into consideration every word of Bhagavatpāda and, having analysed it, spelt out its actual purport. He expounded the scripture strictly in accordance with the commentary of Bhagavatpāda. He effortlessly integrated into His teaching of Vedānta pertinent points from Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā, and Yoga. When the Vedānta-śāstra is taught, one way is to explain a text line by line. Another is to expound the lines along with one's experience. The latter characterised His teaching; it gave great joy.

Whenever He delineated scriptural intricacies in a *vidvat-sadas* (assembly of scholars), such as when He expounded the *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa* of the *Brahmasūtra*-s at Mysore, all the scholars were struck with awe. Even though My *Guru* was a consummate scholar, He did not have the slightest egoism. During the annual *vidvat-sadas*, if anyone spoke something new, He used to be immensely pleased. Even if He saw an iota of knowledge in another, He experienced great happiness.

When My *Paramaguru* was alive, numerous were the disciples who were greatly devoted to Him. Seeing His learning, austerity and compassion, they wondered, "Will such a person ever be seen again? Will the glory of the Peetham remain?" Many had such doubts. However, on observing My *Guru*, their doubts were set at rest and they felt, "What a scholar! What a person established in the Truth! What a master of His senses! What an inward-turned one!"

Kālidāsa has said:

प्रवर्तितो दीप इव प्रदीपात् (*Raghuvaṁśa* V.37d)

(Just as a lamp lighted from another does not differ from the latter.)

If one lamp were to light another lamp, what would be the difference between the two lamps? Only the one who lit the second lamp would know, "I lit it." To an observer, both would only appear to be lamps, with no distinction discernible. Similar was the case of My *Paramaguru* and My *Guru*. When people heard the discourses that My *Guru* gave while He toured, saw His worship of God and so on, they remembered the words of the *Mādhavīya-Śaṅkaravijaya*:

शंभोर्मूर्तिश्चरति भुवने शङ्कराचार्यरूपा (IV.60d)

(The figure of Śiva, Dakṣiṇāmūrti, moves about in the world in the form of Śaṅkarācārya.)

When My *Guru* arrived in Tamilnadu during His tour, He was not familiar with Tamil. Nonetheless, purely out of gracious

consideration for the wishes of the devotees, He agreed to address them in Tamil. To the amazement of all, including the Math officials who were apprehensive, He straightaway spoke flawlessly and eloquently in chaste Tamil. Thereafter, throughout His tour of Tamilnadu, He conversed and discoursed freely in Tamil like a native speaker. Moreover, even scholars opined that many of His words and expressions conveyed that He was quite conversant with classical Tamil literature and with the nuances of modern Tamil.

तमांसि ध्वंसन्ते परिणमति भूयानुपशमः
सकृत्संवादेऽपि प्रथत इह चामुत्र च फलम् ।
अथ प्रत्यासङ्गः कमपि महिमानं वितनुते
प्रसन्नानां वाचः फलमपरिमेयं प्रसुवते ॥

(Ignorance is destroyed and great tranquillity results. Even a single conversation yields fruits here and in the world attained after death. Close association bestows some form of greatness. The words of the pure ones give rise to limitless fruit.)
I have seen in My *Guru*'s case all that has been mentioned in the above verse.

Many approached My *Guru* to have their sufferings quelled. At times, some failed to voice their wishes and left with the thought, "I was unable to put across my problem." Yet, by the time they left for home, they found that their suffering had ceased. Such was the direct experience of relief of even those who did not state their problems to Him. Often, My *Guru* gave fitting replies to disciples even before they posed any query or request to Him. One day, after He had given clarifications thus and permitted the devotees to leave, I, who was then a young boy, asked Him, "How is it, O Mahaswami, that when people come to You to seek clarifications, You provide the answers even before they present their requests?" He replied, "There is nothing to it. God is the one who impels Me and I respond in accordance with His wishes. Such being the case, whatever is in His mind automatically comes to My mouth. I need to make no effort." He was a

mahātman who had attained such perfection. He never took credit for the benefits experienced by devotees. He invariably maintained that the grace of God was what was responsible.

My *Guru* did not come out of His abode during the performance of a *sahasracaṇḍī-yāga* at Sringeri. However, He told Me, "If the Lord is pleased, it will rain when the *pūrṇāhuti* (final offering) is completed." At the start of the *pūrṇāhuti*, the sky was totally clear. No covering of even the size of a one-rupee coin was visible. Yet, as the *pūrṇāhuti* progressed, dark clouds began to gather. In minutes, the sky was overcast. As the *pūrṇāhuti* ended, it began to rain cats and dogs.

My *Guru* often emphasised the importance of deep devotion to God and the performance of one's duties as prescribed by God through the scripture. He held that a human life, which is the consequence of much merit and difficult to obtain, is worthless if one has no devotion, regardless of whatever else one may have. On the other hand, any life wherein one has devotion to God is preferable even if it be that as a worm.

ब्रह्मनिष्ठैरस्मदाचार्यपादैर्विरचितानि स्तोत्राणि बहूनि सन्ति । तानि सर्वाण्यपि भगवद्भक्तिभावोज्जृम्भितानि । (Benedictory preface to *Śrīgururājasūktimālikā*)

(My revered *Achārya*, who was ever absorbed in *Brahman,* has composed many *stotra*-s. Every one of them brims with devotion to God.)

If anyone approached Him with a desire for knowledge, My *Guru* imparted knowledge to that person. He even had the capacity to straightaway confer the direct realisation of the Supreme on a duly competent disciple. Enlightened *mahātman*-s too came to pay their respects to Him. He dealt with them as Himself. His knowledge, qualities such as mind control, establishment in the *Ātman* and compassion to beings serve as

ideals. He led His life in such a way that there accrued the welfare of the world.

People tie a bell to the neck of a cow and also decorate the animal with a garland. The cow does not care whether the bell and the garland remain or fall off. My *Guru*'s attitude towards His body was similar. He even expressed an opinion to a disciple that on His death, His body could well be simply cast into a river to serve as food for some creatures. When He felt that He had completed His work on earth, He went before daybreak to the river Tuṅgā and, without giving any inkling to anyone, shed His mortal coil. It cannot be said that He fell into the river and drowned, for not a single drop of water entered His body. There was no sign of any discomfort on His face. On the other hand, it was thoroughly tranquil and pleasing like that of one seated in *samādhi*.

पादप्रभाविनिर्धूताविद्यान्धतमसाय ते ।
यतये चितिनिर्विष्टचित्तायास्तु नमो मम ॥

(My salutation to the ascetic whose mind is absorbed in consciousness and the lustre of whose feet destroys the blinding darkness of *avidyā*.)

श्रीमद्विष्णुपदाऽऽलम्बं वेदान्तामृतवर्षिणम् ।
लोकसंतापशमनं वन्देऽभ्रसदृशं गुरुम् ॥

(I pay obeisance to the cloud-like *Guru*, who abides in (the sky that is) the Supreme Brahman, pours forth the nectar of Vedānta and terminates the sufferings of people.)

विनयावनतः श्रीमद्गुरुपादाम्बुजन्मनी ।
दयामरन्दे शिष्यालिश्चुम्बति श्रद्धया सदा ॥

(Bowing low with humility, the disciple - the bee - gently touches, ever with faith, the feet of the celebrated *Guru* which are lotuses containing the nectar of mercy.)

गुरुवरचरणौ भक्त्या नित्यं प्रणमामि भक्तकरुणालू ।
यद्भानुलेशपातो हृदयध्वान्तानि सन्ततं हन्ति ॥
(I daily prostrate with devotion before the pre-eminent *Guru*'s feet, which are merciful to devotees and an infinitesimal exposure to whose lustre always destroys the entire darkness (of ignorance) of the mind.)

श्रीमद्गुरुवरान्वन्दे वन्दारुजनवत्सलान् ।
यत्पादाब्जदयालेशो भवकान्तारतारकः ॥
(I salute the glorious, foremost of *Guru*-s, who is highly gracious to those who pay obeisance and a wee bit of the kindness of whose feet is itself the saviour in the forest of *saṁsāra*.)

श्रुतिमस्तकभूषायमाणपादसरोरुहम् ।
नतार्तिहरणं कुर्वे शरणं देशिकारुणम् ॥
(I seek refuge in that sun among preceptors whose lotus-like feet are decorated by the *Upaniṣad*-s and who removes the afflictions of those who pay obeisance.)

किरीटयाम्युत्तमाङ्गे पादुके देशिकस्य ते ।
ययोः स्मृतेर्हि लोकानां स्वान्तध्वान्तं प्रणश्यति ॥
(I place as a crown on My head Your - My preceptor's - pair of *pādukā*-s, the remembrance of which certainly terminates the mental darkness of mankind.)

श्रीमतां देशिकेन्द्राणां पादपद्मे नमाम्यहम् ।
मन्दोऽपि वन्दनाद्येषां विन्देत गुरुतुल्यताम् ॥
(I prostrate before the lotus-like feet of the glorious king of preceptors by paying obeisance to whom even a dullard becomes akin to the *Guru*.)

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जीवन्मुक्तभारती

श्रीगुरुभ्यो नमः
श्रीसच्चिदानन्दशिवाभिनवनृसिंहभारतीगुरुभ्यो नमः ॥

श्रीमच्छाङ्करभाष्यमेयमखिलं बुद्धौ प्रकाश्यान्तरं
सारं संविवरीवरीतुमतुलं सामर्थ्यमव्याहतम् ।
दत्वा मे जडतां विधूय गुरुराट् श्रीदक्षिणास्यांशजः
साफल्यं जनुषस्तनोतु सुमति श्रीकण्ठतृप्त्यै मम ॥

शुद्धसत्त्वमयी सच्चिदानन्दघनबोधिनी ।
चित्ते श्रीशारदाम्बा मे भासतां गुरुसन्नुता ॥

इह खलु नित्यत्वात् निरतिशयसुखरूपत्वादात्यन्तिकदुःख-निवृत्तिरूपत्वाच्च धर्मादिषु चतुर्षु पुरुषार्थेषु ललामायमानः स्वयंज्योतिरानन्दब्रह्मस्वरूपो मोक्षः 'ज्ञानादेव तु कैवल्यम्' 'तमेव विदित्वाऽतिमृत्युमेति' 'नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय' 'तरति शोकमात्मवित्' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः ज्ञानैकलभ्यः । तच्च ज्ञानं 'नावेदविन्मनुते तं बृहन्तम्' 'तं त्वौपनिषदं पुरुषं पृच्छामि' 'वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाः' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः उपनिषद्विचारैकजन्य-मिति तद्विचारस्य मन्दमतिभिः स्वतः कर्तुमशक्यत्वात् करुणा-सागरः भगवान् कृष्णद्वैपायनः मुमुक्षूणाम् अनात्मभ्यो विवेकेन

नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तप्रत्यगभिन्नाद्वितीयब्रह्मतत्त्वप्रतिपत्तिसम्पत्तये 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' इत्यारभ्य 'अनावृत्तिश्शब्दादनावृत्तिश्शब्दात्' इत्यन्तैस्सूत्रजालैः द्विनवत्युत्तरशताधिकरणात्मकं ब्रह्ममीमांसाशास्त्रं प्राणैषीत् । तत्रेदमादिममधिकरणम् 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' इति । अधिकरणं नाम 'विषयो विशयश्चैव पूर्वपक्षस्तथोत्तरः । प्रयोजनं सङ्गतिश्च शास्त्रेऽधिकरणं स्मृतम् ॥' इत्यभियुक्तोक्त्या विषय-सन्देह-पूर्वपक्ष-सिद्धान्त-प्रयोजन-सङ्गतिरूपाणां षण्णामङ्गानां समुदायात्मकम् । अस्मिन्नधिकरणे 'आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यः' 'सोऽन्वेष्टव्यः स विजिज्ञासितव्यः' इत्यादिविचारविधायकवाक्यजातं विषयः । तत्किं विचारं विधत्ते न वा इति विचारस्य विषयप्रयोजनभावाभावाभ्यां संशयः । नाहं ब्रह्मेति भेदग्राहिप्रत्यक्षेण, कर्तृत्वाकर्तृत्वादिविरुद्धधर्मलिङ्गकानुमानेन, 'द्वा सुपर्णा' इत्यादिश्रुत्या च जीवब्रह्मणोः भेदावगमेन तदैक्यरूपविषयासम्भवात्, सत्यस्य बन्धस्य ज्ञानमात्रनिवर्त्यत्वासम्भवेन, बन्धनिवृत्तिरूपप्रयोजनासम्भवाच्च, निर्विषयं निष्फलं च विचारं न विधत्ते श्रुतिरिति पूर्वपक्षः ।

वेदान्तार्थनिर्णयोत्थापकत्वात् सूत्राणाम् उत्थाप्योत्थापकभावः श्रुतिसङ्गतिः । साक्षात् परम्परया वा शास्त्रप्रतिपाद्यार्थप्रतिपादकत्वं शास्त्रसङ्गतिः । क्रमेण समन्वयाविरोधसाधनफलानि अध्यायप्रमेयाणि । स्पष्टब्रह्मलिङ्गकानां वाक्यानां ब्रह्मणि समन्वयः प्रथमपादे । ब्रह्मलिङ्गे स्पष्टत्वञ्च जीवादिविषयकत्वेन सम्भाव्यमानस्वारस्यकलिङ्गानभिभूतत्वम् । अत्र 'ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम्' इत्यादि-

सर्वात्मत्वादिलिङ्गबोधकानां वाक्यानां परिच्छेदत्रयशून्यार्थकब्रह्मपद-घटितसूत्रेण समन्वयस्य कृतत्वात् पादसङ्गतिः। प्राथम्यादस्याधि-करणस्य नापेक्ष्यते अधिकरणसङ्गतिः। सिद्धान्तस्तु उद्देश्यविधेय-भावस्थले असति बाधके उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकप्रयोज्यत्वस्य विधेये भाननियमस्य 'धनी सुखी' इत्यादौ दृष्टचरत्वेन 'तरति शोकमात्मवित्' इति श्रुत्या आत्मवेदनप्रयोज्यत्वस्य शोकरूपबन्धतरणे प्रतीयमानत्वेन, सत्यत्वे बन्धस्य ज्ञानान्निवृत्तिरूपतरणस्यासम्भवात् उद्देश्यविधेयभावमहिम्ना अवगतयागगतस्वर्गसाधनतानिर्वाहाय 'यजेत स्वर्गकाम' इत्यादौ अपूर्वस्येव रज्ज्वादिज्ञानमात्रनिवर्त्यसर्पादेरिव बन्धस्य अध्यस्तत्वं कल्प्यते श्रुतार्थापत्तिप्रमाणात्। तथा च रज्जुसाक्षात्कारनिवर्त्यसर्परूपाध्यासाश्रयस्य इदमंशस्य रज्ज्व-भिन्नत्वमिव ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारनिवर्त्यप्रमातृत्वकर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादि-रूपाध्यासाश्रयस्य जीवस्य ब्रह्माभिन्नत्वं निरपवादम्। तस्मात् सम्भावितकरणदोषस्य प्रत्यक्षस्य अपौरुषेयतया निर्दोषश्रुतिबाधन-क्षमत्वायोगात् तन्मूलकानुमानस्यापि तत्समानयोगक्षेमत्वात् 'स वा एष महानज आत्मा योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु हृद्यन्तर्ज्योतिः पुरुषः' 'तत्त्वमसि' 'अहं ब्रह्मास्मि' 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः प्रतीयमानजीवब्रह्मैक्यस्य भेदनिषेधार्थं लोकसिद्धभेदानुवादि'द्वा सुपर्णे'तिश्रुत्यविरोधाच्च सूपपत्तिः। तथा च विषयस्य विचारेण जायमानतत्साक्षात्कारेणाध्यस्तबन्धनिवृत्तिरूपप्रयोजनस्य च निर्बाध-त्वात् 'श्रोतव्यः' 'स विजिज्ञासितव्यः' इत्यादिवाक्यं विषय-प्रयोजनवन्तं विचारं विधत्त इति सूच्यते विचारकर्तव्यताप्रतिपादकेन सूत्रेण 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' इति।

तत्र ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाः कृतिसाध्यत्वाभावेनारम्भमनभिदधता विचारकर्तव्यतारूपवाक्यार्थे क्रियायां कर्तृत्व-कर्मत्व-करणत्वादि-रूपकारकरूपेणान्वयासम्भवेन मङ्गलस्य शङ्खवीणाशब्दश्रवणवत् स्वीयश्रवणोच्चारणमात्रेणैवावश्यकमर्थान्तरं बोधयताऽपि मङ्गलं प्रयोजयता शक्त्या तद्बोधनेऽप्रवर्तमानेन 'तदुदितस्स हि यो यदनन्तरः' इति न्यायेनानन्तर्ये बोध्यमाने, कार्यकारणभावाविना-भूततया आनन्तर्यविषयताव्यापकविषयताकतया च पूर्वप्रकृतहेतुभेद-स्यापि सुज्ञानतया तत्कथने अव्याप्रियमाणेन 'अथ'शब्देन 'मङ्गलानन्तरारम्भप्रश्नकात्स्न्र्येष्वथो अथ' इति कोशानुरोधेनानन्तर्य-मभिधीयते । तत्र यत्स्थितौ ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा नियमेन फलमादध्यात्, यदभावे न, तस्यैवानन्तर्यावधित्वं युक्तम् । तच्च नित्यानित्यविवेक-वैराग्य-शमादिषट्क-मुमुक्षुत्वरूपसाधनचतुष्टयमेव । तत्र सोमपान-चातुर्मास्ययामादिफलनित्यत्वबोधकश्रुतिवशेन कर्मफलवैराग्यमुमुक्षुत्व-योरसम्भवशङ्कायां तदपनुनुत्सया अतश्शब्दः प्रायोजि । तदर्थस्तु साधनचतुष्टयसम्भवादिति । यत्कृतकं तदनित्यम् इति व्याप्तिबोधक-'तद्यथेह कर्मचितः' इति श्रुत्यनुसारेण 'अपाम सोमममृता अभूम' 'अक्षय्यं ह वै चातुर्मास्ययाजिनः सुकृतं भवति' इति श्रुत्योः 'आभूत-संप्लवं स्थानममृतत्वं हि भाष्यते' इति स्मृत्यनुसारेण आपेक्षिक-नित्यफलार्थकतया नेयत्वात् । 'ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्' इति परम-पुरुषार्थस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानसाध्यत्वकथनेन कर्मफलवैराग्यं मुमुक्षुत्वं च सुघटमेव। तथा च अथातः शब्दाभ्यां 'सम्भवत्साधनचतुष्टयसम्पत्यनन्तरम्'

इति बोध्यते । ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा । ब्रह्म च 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' इति वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणम् । जिज्ञासेत्यत्र सनः कृत्प्रत्ययत्वात् कृद्योगे कर्तृकर्मवाचकपदोत्तरं षष्ठीत्यर्थक'कर्तृकर्मणोः कृती'ति सूत्रानुसारेण कर्मसाकाङ्क्षत्वाच्च जिज्ञासायाः 'तद्विजिज्ञासस्व' 'स विजिज्ञासितव्यः' 'आत्मा श्रोतव्यः' इत्यादिविषयवाक्यानुसाराच्च कर्मत्वार्थिका षष्ठी । ज्ञातुमिच्छा जिज्ञासा । अवगतिपर्यन्तं ज्ञानं सन्वाच्यायाः इच्छायाः कर्म । आवरणनिवृत्तिरूपाभिव्यक्तिमच्चैतन्यम् अवगतिः पर्यन्तः अवधिः यस्याखण्डसाक्षात्कारात्मकवृत्तिज्ञानस्य तादृशं वृत्तिज्ञानं सर्वानर्थहेतुभूतं स्वप्रकाशानन्दावारकमज्ञानं भङ्क्त्वा चैतन्यमभिव्यनक्तीति साक्षात्तस्य सुखदुःखाभावान्यतररूपत्वाभावेऽपि नित्यनिरतिशयानन्दाभिव्यञ्जकत्वेनाज्ञाननिवृत्तिद्वारा आत्यन्तिकदुःखनिवृत्तिहेतुत्वाच्च फलत्वं द्योतयितुम् अवगतिपर्यन्तं ज्ञानमित्युक्तं फलविषयत्वादिच्छाया इति च । एतत्स्पष्टीकृतं 'ब्रह्मावगतिर्हि पुरुषार्थः निश्शेषसंसारबीजाविद्याद्यनर्थनिबर्हणात्' इति । श्रुतिसमानार्थत्वाय अध्याह्रियमाणकर्तव्येति पदार्थान्वयानुपपत्त्या सन्प्रत्ययस्य इच्छासाध्ये विचारे लक्षणा । तथा च साधनचतुष्टयसम्पन्नेन पुरुषधौरेयेण बन्धनिवर्तकज्ञानोद्देशेन ब्रह्मविचारः कर्तव्यः इत्यर्थः सूत्रस्य । तथा च ब्रह्मविचारस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानजनकतया जीवस्य ब्रह्मान्यत्वे तज्ज्ञानेन जीवगतबन्धानिवृत्तेः तयोरैक्यरूपविषयस्य तत्सिद्ध्यर्थं ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वसिद्ध्यर्थञ्च 'तरति शोकमात्मवित्' 'तथा विद्वान् नामरूपाद्विमुक्तः' इत्यादिश्रुत्या बन्धस्याध्यस्तत्वसिद्ध्या

बन्धनिवृत्तिरूपप्रयोजनस्यापि सूचिततया 'श्रोतव्यः' 'स विजिज्ञासितव्यः' इत्यादिवाक्यं सविषयं सप्रयोजनं च विचारं विधत्ते इति सिद्धान्तः सूत्रितः ।

अयं विषयप्रयोजनसिद्धिहेतुरध्यास एव न सम्भवति, चिज्जडयोरात्मानात्मनोः तमःप्रकाशवत् परस्परैक्यायोग्यत्वेन धर्मिणोरेव तादात्म्याभावे तद्धर्माणां सङ्करस्य सुतरामसम्भवात् । अनात्मधर्मत्वेन जिगदिषितानां कर्तृत्वादीनाम् आत्मन्यध्यारोपणस्य अयुक्तत्वात् लोके अध्यासकारणत्वेन क्लृप्तस्य अधिष्ठान-सामान्यारोप्यविशेषैक्यप्रमाहितसंस्कारस्य निरवयवनिर्गुणस्व-प्रकाशात्मनि गुणादिसादृश्यस्य अज्ञानस्य च अभावात् इन्द्रियवेद्य-त्वाभावाच्चात्मनः अध्यासाधिष्ठानत्वानुपपत्तिः । लक्षणप्रमाणाभ्यां हि विषयसिद्धिः । तयोरप्यभावात् नाध्याससिद्धिरिति तदसिद्धौ विषयप्रयोजनविरहात्कथं विचारविधिरिति चेदत्रोच्यते –

प्रचण्डमार्तण्डमण्डले पेचकानुभवसिद्धान्धकारवत् अहमज्ञ इत्यनुभवसिद्धमज्ञानं दुरपह्नवम् । तथा चाधिष्ठानयाथात्म्याज्ञानम् अध्यासकारणमेकं सिद्धमेव । नीरूपेऽपि गगने मालिन्याद्यध्यास-दर्शनात् सादृश्यस्य अध्यासनैयत्यासिद्धिः । एतेन इन्द्रियवेद्यत्वम् अध्यासाधिष्ठानत्वप्रयोजकं प्रत्युक्तम्, इन्द्रियावेद्येऽपि गगनेऽध्यास-दर्शनात् । नीरूपरूपवतोः गगनमलिनयोरिव प्रकृतेऽपि चिज्जडयोः इहैवास्मि सदने जानानः इत्यादिरीत्याऽनुभूयमानस्य ऐक्याध्यासस्य अपलपितुमशक्यत्वाच्च । कथमन्यथा सदनैकदेशवृत्तित्वम् अपरिच्छिन्ने आत्मनि ज्ञातरि चेतने, शरीरे वाऽचेतने ज्ञातृत्वं

च व्यवहरेत् । ऐक्यप्रमाहितसंस्कारकारणकत्वस्य गगनमालिन्याध्यास एव व्यभिचारात् तद्वति तत्प्रकारकत्वाघटितानुभवत्वघटितरूपेण कारणतायां लाघवात् । पूर्वपूर्वाध्यासरूपैक्यानुभवाहितसंस्कारस्य च निमित्तस्य सत्त्वात् स्वच्छत्वादिसादृश्यस्य बुद्ध्यात्मनोस्सम्भवाच्च आत्मनि कर्तृत्वादेरध्यस्तत्वं निर्बाधम् । न खल्वत्र प्रमाणं गवेषणीयम् । मनुष्योऽहम् - ब्राह्मणोऽहम् - जातः - म्रिये - रुग्णः - स्थूलोऽहम् - कृशोऽहम् - गौरोऽहम् - तिष्ठामि - गच्छामि - लङ्घयामीत्यादिना शरीरतद्धर्माध्यासस्य, मूकः - क्लीबः - बधिरः - काणः - अन्धोऽहमितीन्द्रियधर्माध्यासस्य, कामये - सङ्कल्पयामि - अध्यवस्यामि - करोमि - श्रद्धे - सन्देह्मि - बिभेमि - जिह्रेमीत्याद्यन्तःकरणतद्धर्माध्यासस्य, क्षुधितोऽहम्, - तृषार्तोऽहम् - उच्छ्वसिमि - निःश्वसिमि इति प्राणधर्माध्यासस्य, जडोऽहम् इति अज्ञानतत्कार्यधर्माध्यासस्य साक्षिप्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वात्, अध्यासाभावेन सुषुप्तौ किंविधस्यापि व्यवहारस्याभावेन सकललौकिकवैदिकप्रमाणव्यवहारान्यथानुपपत्तेश्च तत्र मानत्वात् स्वप्नजागरयोस्सुषुप्तौ चाध्यासान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायित्वं व्यवहारस्य सिद्धम् । अतः शास्त्रयुक्तिभ्यां जडाजडविवेचनचतुरेष्वपि हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारार्थप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिदर्शनात् परोक्षजडाजडभेदज्ञानस्य अपरोक्षाध्यासबाधकत्वाभावेन श्रवणमननानन्तरमपि विपरीतभावनानिवर्तकत्वेन निदिध्यासनस्य विधानाच्च महावाक्यजन्याखण्डसाक्षात्कारपर्यन्तं स्वकारणस्य मूलाज्ञानस्य निवृत्त्यभावेन, व्युत्थानावस्थाकालिकज्ञानिव्यवहारस्यापि बाधिताध्यासमूलकत्वेन लोकसिद्धस्सर्वोऽपि

व्यवहारः अध्याससद्भावे लिङ्गम् । तथा च साक्षिप्रत्यक्षम्, अर्थापत्तिः, अनुमानं च अध्यासे प्रमाणानि ।

अयं चाध्यासो द्विविधः अर्थाध्यासः ज्ञानाध्यासश्चेति । लक्षणं तु स्मृतिरूपः परत्र पूर्वदृष्टावभासः इति । स्मृतेः रूपमिव रूपं यस्येति व्युत्पत्त्या संस्कारजन्यत्वरूपस्मृतिगतधर्मवान् इत्यर्थः। परत्र (दृष्टं दर्शनं) पूर्वदृष्टादवभासः पूर्वदृष्टावभासः, संस्कारद्वारा पूर्वानुभवजन्यत्वं स्मृतिसादृश्यम् उक्तम् । अर्थाध्यासस्य कर्मणि क्तिन्नन्तस्मृतिशब्देन स्मर्यमाणोपस्थापनात् संस्कारजन्यज्ञान-विषयत्वरूपस्मर्यमाणसादृश्यं स्मृतिरूपपदेनोच्यते । परत्र स्वाभाव-वत्यधिकरणे अवभासः भावप्रत्ययान्तत्वं, ज्ञानपरतायाम् अवभास-शब्दस्य । स्वस्य ज्ञानम् अध्यासः इदं रजतम् इत्यादिभ्रमः । स्वपदेन रजतादिकं स्वीकर्तव्यम् । स्वाभाववत्यां शुक्तौ अवभासत इति अवभासशब्दस्य कर्मप्रत्ययान्तत्वम्, अर्थाध्यासपरतायाम् । स्वाभाववद्विशेष्यकज्ञानप्रकार इत्यर्थः । अत्र च अव्याप्यवृत्ति-संयोगादौ पूर्वं स्वाभाववति पश्चादानीते घटादौ च भूत्वावच्छेदेन भासमानगन्धादौ च अतिव्याप्तिवारणाय एकावच्छेदेन स्वसंसृज्य-माने स्वात्यन्ताभाववत्यवभास्यत्वम् अर्थाध्यासस्य लक्षणम् । तेन संयोगतदभावयोः अवच्छेदकभेदात् स्वसंसृज्यमान इत्यत्र वर्तमानकालबोधकशानचा स्वसंसर्गात्यन्ताभावयोः समानकालिकत्व-बोधनात् घटतदभावयोः एकत्र समानकालिकत्वाभावेन भुवि गन्धाभावाभावाच्च नातिव्याप्तिः । यद्यपि सिद्धान्ते ब्रह्मव्यतिरिक्तस्य सर्वस्याप्यध्यस्तत्वात् संयोगादीनां लक्ष्यत्वात् अतिव्याप्तिकथनं तत्र

कथमिति शङ्का जायेत, तथापि परमते प्रमात्मकज्ञानविषयत्वेन सिद्धेषु तेषु यथाश्रुत'परत्र अवभास' इति लक्षणसत्त्वे प्रपञ्चे शुक्तिरजतादावपि संयोगादिवदव्याप्यवृत्तित्वादिभ्रमस्स्यादतः लक्षणं परिष्कृतम् । तथा च यदवच्छेदेन संयोगः तदवच्छेदेनैव तस्य अभावः अस्माभिस्सिषाधयिषितः इति नानभिमतार्थसिद्धिः सिद्धसाधनं वा । यत्र लक्षणं सङ्गमनीयं स एव स्वपदार्थः । तथा च स्वपदेन तादात्म्यसम्बन्धेन प्रकारस्य रजतादेः परिग्रहे इदंत्वावच्छेदेन स्वसंसर्गवत्यां शुक्तौ वस्तुतः स्वाभाववत्याम् अवभास्यत्वं शुक्तिरजते वर्तत इति लक्षणसमन्वयः । आत्मत्वावच्छेदेन कर्तृत्वादिसंसर्गवति वस्तुतस्तदभाववत्यवभास्यत्वमस्ति कर्तृत्वादिरूपबन्ध इति तत्रापि लक्षणमस्ति । एवं निष्प्रपञ्चे ब्रह्मणि सर्वोऽपि प्रपञ्चः भासत इति प्रपञ्चस्य अध्यस्तत्वम् । अध्यासद्वयसाधारणं लक्षणं तु पदार्थविशिष्टत्वम् । वैशिष्ट्यं स्वविशिष्टधर्मावच्छिन्नविशेष्यतानिरूपितप्रकारताविशिष्टत्वसम्बन्धेन । धर्मे स्ववैशिष्ट्यं च स्वप्रतियोगिकसंसर्गानुयोगितावच्छेदकत्वस्वसमानकालिकस्वाभावसंसर्गानुयोगितावच्छेदकत्वरूपसम्बन्धद्वयेन । प्रकारतावैशिष्ट्यं च निरूपकत्वस्वरूपान्यतरसम्बन्धेनेति । स्वपदेन शुक्तिरजतस्य ग्रहणे स्वप्रतियोगिकतादात्म्यसंसर्गानुयोगितावच्छेदकत्वं शुक्तिनिष्ठे इदंत्वे । एवं स्वसमानकालिकरजताभावप्रतियोगिकस्वरूपसंबन्धानुयोगितावच्छेदकत्वमपीति सम्बन्धद्वयेन तद्विशिष्टेदंत्वावच्छिन्नत्वं शुक्तिनिष्ठविशेष्यतायाम् इदं रजतमिति ज्ञानीयायाम् । तन्निरूपितप्रकारतानिरूपकतासम्बन्धेन इदं रजतमिति ज्ञाने स्वरूपसम्बन्धेन

रजत इति उभयत्र लक्षणसमन्वयः । अत्राधिष्ठानारोप्य-स्वरूपविवादेऽपि परत्र अवभासलक्षणं सर्वसम्मतम् । तथा हि - 'आत्मख्यातिरसत्ख्यातिरख्यातिः ख्यातिरन्यथा । तथाऽनिर्वचन-ख्यातिरित्येतत्ख्यातिपञ्चकम् ॥'

आत्मख्यातिवादी योगाचारः बुद्धिरूपात्मधर्मस्य आन्तरस्य रजतस्य बाह्यशुक्तौ आरोप इति वदति । अन्यत्र बाह्यशुक्तौ अन्यधर्मस्य बुद्धिरूपात्मधर्मस्य रजतस्यान्तरस्याध्यास इति भाष्यार्थः । शून्यवादी तु अत्यन्तमसतः रजतस्य अधिष्ठाने अवभास इति वदति । तत्र अन्ये तु यत्र यदध्यासः तस्यैव विपरीतधर्मत्वकल्पनामाचक्षते इति वाक्यं यत्र शुक्त्यादौ यदध्यासः रजतादेरध्यासः तस्यैव शुक्त्यादेरधिष्ठानस्य विपरीतः विरुद्धः धर्मः अत्यन्तमसन् यस्य स विपरीतधर्मा । तस्य भावः तत्त्वम् । विपरीतविशिष्टत्वं च विपरीतधर्म एव । विशिष्टाद्भावप्रत्यय इति न्यायात् । तत्कल्पनाम् अत्यन्तासद्रजतधर्मकत्वकल्पनाम् आचक्षते इति योजनीयम् ।

प्राभाकरास्त्वख्यातिवादिनः । तेषां मते सर्वं ज्ञानं यथार्थम् । भ्रमस्थले इदमिति पुरोवृत्तिव्यक्तिप्रत्यक्षं रजतमिति रजतस्मरणं तयोर्ज्ञानयोः तद्विषययोश्च भेदाग्रहात् प्रवृत्तिरिति मतम् । उपस्थितेष्टभेदाग्रहस्यैव प्रवर्तकत्वात् (उपस्थितं स्मृतं यदिष्टं रजतं तद्भेदाग्रह इत्यर्थः) । न च ज्ञानयोर्भेदाग्रहस्याङ्गीकारवैयर्थ्यं शङ्क्यम् । इदंत्वावच्छिन्नविषयतानिरूपितरजतविषयताशालि-ज्ञानत्वेन विशिष्टज्ञानसाधारण्येन प्रवर्तकतावच्छेदकानुगमसिद्ध्यर्थं

तथाङ्गीकारात् । ज्ञानभेदावगमे तदीयविषयतयोः निरूप्य-निरूपकभावासम्भवात् । न च नेदं रजतमिति ज्ञानानन्तरमपि ज्ञानद्वयस्य बाधकज्ञानबाध्यत्वाभावेन इदमिति पुरोवृत्तिव्यक्ति-प्रत्यक्षस्य रजतस्मरणस्य च सम्भवे बाधकाभावेन प्रवृत्त्यापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । अत एव उपस्थितेष्टभेदाग्रहस्यापि हेतुत्वोक्तेः । नेदं रजतमिति ज्ञानकाले भेदग्रहस्यैव सत्त्वात् । इदमुक्तं केचित्तु यत्र यदध्यासः इति परैरुच्यते तद्विवेकाग्रहः तयोर्विषययोः तद्धियोश्च विवेकाग्रहः भेदाग्रहः तन्निबन्धनो भ्रमः इदं रजतमिति विशिष्ट-व्यवहार इत्यर्थकेन वाक्येन ।

Sacred Words of a Liberated Sage

(A Rendering of *Jīvanmuktabhāratī* into English, with explanatory notes)

Obeisance to the glorious *Guru*

Salutation to the revered *Guru*, Sri Sacchidananda Sivabhinava Nrisimha Bharathi Mahaswamigal

May My pre-eminent *Guru*, who is an incarnation of Lord Dakṣiṇāmūrti, make the complete subject matter of Śrī Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda's commentaries shine clearly in My mind, bestow upon Me unimpeded and unmatched capacity to properly expound its inmost essence for the satisfaction of Lord Śiva and the Divine Mother, eradicate My dullness and make My birth fruitful.

May Goddess Śāradā, who is revered by My *Guru*, is an embodiment of pure *sattva-guṇa* and confers knowledge of the Supreme, which is undifferentiated existence, consciousness and bliss, manifest in My mind.

Amongst virtue, wealth, desire and liberation, the four objects of human life, liberation that is of the nature of the self-effulgent, blissful Brahman is certainly the best. This is because liberation is eternal, is of the form of unsurpassable bliss and is characterised by the absolute cessation of unhappiness. It can be attained only through knowledge. This is established by the declarations of the *śruti* such as: "Absoluteness is achieved through knowledge alone"; "Only by knowing Him, one transcends death. There is no other path to immortality (*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* III.8)" and, "The knower of the Self goes beyond sorrow (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VII.1.3)." The knowledge that liberates arises only through enquiry into the import of the *Upaniṣad*-s. This is discernible from passages of the *śruti* like: "He who is not versed in the *Veda*-s cannot reflect on that great Entity (*Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* III.12.9.7)"; "I ask you about that Being who is to be known only from the *Upaniṣad*-s (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* III.9.26)" and, "Those who have fully ascertained the Entity directly made known by the *Upaniṣad*-s become freed on every side (*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* III.2.6)."

The said enquiry cannot be performed unaided by those whose intellects are not sharp. Being an ocean of compassion, the divine Vyāsa therefore authored the *Brahmamīmāṁsā-śāstra* to enable seekers of liberation to discriminate the non-Self from the Self and realise the true nature of the ever pure, ever enlightened, ever free, non-dual Brahman, which is not different from the inmost self. This work comprises the host of aphorisms that begin with, "*athāto brahmajijñāsā*" and end with, "*anāvṛttiḥ śabdād-anāvṛttiḥ śabdāt*" and form 192 *adhikaraṇa*-s. The first *adhikaraṇa* is constituted by the sole aphorism, "*athāto brahmajijñāsā*." The wise have specified thus what an *adhikaraṇa* is: "The topic to be explained, doubt, the *prima facie* view, the final, ascertained position, utility and connection are regarded as characterising an *adhikaraṇa*." Thus, an *adhikaraṇa* is marked by a combination of six constituents, which are the subject matter, doubt, *prima facie* view, conclusion, benefit and relation.

In the first *adhikaraṇa*, the subject is the set of scriptural passages that prescribe enquiry into the Self such as, "My dear, the Self should be realised; It should be heard of, reflected on and firmly concentrated upon (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* II.4.5)" and, "That Self should be known. That should be inquired into for realisation (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VIII.7.1)." Do these scriptural passages actually prescribe enquiry into the Self or not and, thus, does the said enquiry have any subject matter and utility or not? This is the doubt.

Direct perception that one is not the Supreme reveals the difference between the individual self and Brahman. Likewise, inference establishes difference on the ground that the individual self and the Supreme have contradictory attributes such as agency and lack of agency. Moreover, the difference between the individual self and Brahman is expressed by scriptural passages such as, "Two birds (the individual self and the Supreme) that are ever associated and have similar names cling to the same tree (the body). Among these, one (the individual self) eats the fruit

of divergent tastes (of happiness and misery). The other (the Supreme) looks on without eating (*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* III.1.1)." As perception, inference and the scripture reveal the difference between the self and Brahman, their unity cannot be the subject matter to be ascertained through enquiry. Further, since real bondage cannot be removed solely by knowledge, such enquiry cannot yield the benefit of the eradication of bondage. Thus, the enquiry about the oneness of the self and Brahman is bereft of scope and utility and the scripture does not prescribe such enquiry. This is the *prima facie* view.

Since the host of aphorisms determine the import of the *Upaniṣad*-s, the first *adhikaraṇa* is related to the *śruti*, the connection being that between what takes up and what is taken up for ascertainment. The *adhikaraṇa* has a relationship with the *Brahmamīmāṁsā-śāstra* characterised by its directly or indirectly propounding the matter established by the said *śāstra*. The four chapters (*adhyāya*-s) of the text deal with: (i) Reconciliation (*samanvaya*) of the passages of the *śruti* by showing that Brahman is the object of the fullest import of all the *Upaniṣad*-s, (ii) Lack of contradiction (*avirodha*) by the *smṛti*-s and logic, (iii) Spiritual practice (*sādhana*) and (iv) Fruit (*phala*). The first quarter (*pāda*) of the first chapter demonstrates that Brahman is the object of the fullest import of those scriptural passages that contain clear pointers to Brahman. What characterises this clearness is that the signs of Brahman in these passages are not overshadowed by conceivable, fitting pointers therein to the individual self, etc. Scriptural passages like, "All this has got Existence as the Self (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI.9.4)" mention clear characteristics of Brahman like 'being the Self of all'. These clear signs are seen to be in accord with the first *adhikaraṇa*'s sole aphorism that contains the term 'Brahma', which means 'that which is not delimited by space, time and objects'. Hence, this *adhikaraṇa* duly relates to the first quarter (*pāda*). As this is the first *adhikaraṇa*, the question of its relation to a preceding *adhikaraṇa* does not arise.

The final ascertained position (*siddhānta*) of the first *adhikaraṇa* is taken up in the sequel. Consider a statement such as, "A rich man is happy." Here, the subject (*uddeśya*) is 'rich man' and what singles him out is 'richness'. That he is happy is what is predicated (*vidheya*); the characteristic of what is predicated is 'happiness'. It is apparent that richness, which characterises the subject, is presented here as resulting in happiness, which characterises the predicate. The rule is that in such sentences, in the absence of anything to the contrary, the distinguishing feature of the subject is presented as leading to the distinguishing feature of the predicate. The *śruti* declares, "The knower of the Self transcends sorrow, (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VII.1.3)." As per the illustrated rule, the scripture conveys that the knowledge of the Self, the characteristic of the subject, results in the transcendence of sorrow, the characteristic of the predicate.

The *Veda*, through statements such as, "Let the person who is desirous of heaven sacrifice" makes known that Vedic sacrifice is a means to attain heaven. A cause must persist till the dawn of the effect. The Vedic sacrifice, however, ends prior to the performer of the sacrifice attaining heaven. To substantiate the cause and effect relation between the sacrifice and heaven as learnt from the *Veda*, the Mīmāṁsaka-s resort to 'presumption from what is heard of in the scripture (*śrutārthāpatti*)' and admit an unseen potency (*apūrva*) that arises at the completion of the sacrifice and persists till the doer attains heaven. ['Presumption (*arthāpatti*)' is accepted by the Mīmāṁsaka-s and Vedāntin-s as a means of valid knowledge. It is of two kinds: 'presumption from what is seen (*dṛṣṭārthāpatti*)' and 'presumption from what is heard (*śrutārthāpatti*)'. Suppose a person sees a snake in front of him at a place where there is only a rope. Subsequently, as a result of closer inspection, he learns, "This is not a snake." Such negation of the snake would be unreasonable if the snake seen were real. So, one presumes that the snake is false. This is an example of 'presumption from what is seen (*dṛṣṭārthāpatti*)'. On hearing, "The stout Devadatta does not eat during the day", one

presumes that Devadatta eats at night. This is an instance of 'presumption from what is heard (*śrutārthāpatti*)'.] Now, if bondage were real, there would be no possibility of knowledge bringing about its cessation as characterised by the transcendence of all sorrow. In view of the link between the knowledge of the Self and the cessation of bondage, 'presumption from what is heard of in the scripture' establishes, like unseen potency, that bondage is something erroneously superimposed on the Self. The superimposed bondage is akin to a snake that is falsely superimposed on a rope and which is sublated solely by correct knowledge.

Where the right knowledge of a rope is what sublates a superimposed snake, the superimposed snake's substratum that is apprehended as 'this' in the false knowledge, "This is a snake", is none other than the rope. The realisation of Brahman is, as presumed from the teaching of the scripture, what sublates the superimposition of the form, "I am a knower", "I am an agent", "I am an enjoyer", etc. So, in keeping with the rope-snake example, the individual self, the superimposition's basis that appears as 'I' in the false knowledge, is actually not different from Brahman.

Being susceptible to the defects of the senses, perception that reveals the difference between the self and Brahman is incapable of repudiating the revelation of their identity by the *Veda*, which is faultless, as it is not the product of any fallible person. Based as it is on perception, even the inference that makes known the difference between the self and Brahman cannot stand against the scriptural establishment of their identity. As for scriptural statements such as, "Two birds (the individual self and the Supreme) that are ever associated and have similar names cling to the same tree (the body). Among these, one (the individual self) eats the fruit of divergent tastes (of happiness and misery). The other (the Supreme) looks on without eating (*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* III.1.1)", they merely restate the commonly accepted difference between the self and the Supreme in order to facilitate

the repudiation of such difference by the passages teaching unity. Hence, they do not contradict the actual unity of the individual self and Brahman that is revealed by the *Upaniṣad*-s in passages such as the following: "This is that great, unborn Self, the infinite Being that is identified with the intellect, is amidst the organs and is the self-effulgent light within the intellect (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* IV.3.7 and IV.4.22 combined)"; "You are That (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI.8.7)"; "I am Brahman (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* I.4.10)" and, "This self is Brahman (*Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* II)." Thus, the realisation arising from enquiry into the subject of the unity of the self and Brahman can decidedly yield the benefit of the termination of bondage, which is a superimposition. So, the passages of the *Upaniṣad*-s such as, "The Self should be heard of, reflected on and firmly concentrated upon (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* II.4.5)" and, "That Self should be known. That should be inquired into for realisation (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VIII.7.1)" do prescribe an enquiry with a subject and benefit. This is suggested by the first aphorism, "*athāto brahmajijñāsā*", which specifies the requirement of performing this enquiry.

[When duly separated, the words of the first aphorism are '*atha*', '*ataḥ*' and '*brahmajijñāsā*'.] The lexicon *Amarakośa* points out, "The word '*atha*' has the senses of commencement, auspiciousness, sequence, query and totality (III.3.247)." In the first aphorism, the word '*atha*' cannot mean 'commencement', as the desire to know Brahman (*brahmajijñāsā*) is not something accomplishable by action.

[Were the word '*atha*' to mean 'commencement', the *sūtra* would then convey that the desire to know Brahman is to be begun. However, desire, per se, is not something that can be prescribed, unlike an activity such as enquiry. So, '*atha*' in the sense of commencement would not be befitting. The term '*brahmajijñāsa*', which literally means 'the desire to know Brahman', can connote 'enquiry about Brahman'. Then, what the

aphorism conveys, with the portion 'should be performed (*kartavyaḥ*)' assumed, is that enquiry about Brahman should be performed. In this case, if the word '*atha*' were to mean commencement, it would be superfluous.]

Next, the word '*atha*' cannot mean 'auspiciousness' here. Were '*atha*' to mean 'auspiciousness', it would not be syntactically required in this aphorism whose import is that enquiry should be performed. This is because, with regard to the act of enquiry to be performed, '*atha*' would then not pertain to any causative factor, be it the agent of the act of enquiry or the object to which the act is directed or the instrument of the act or what the act is meant for or from where the act proceeds or the locus wherein the act occurs. However, even though meaning something necessary in a sentence, '*atha*' can, by its employment, result in auspiciousness. This is because the mere hearing or utterance of '*atha*' is auspicious, like the hearing of the sound of a conch or a *vīṇā*. Thus, though effecting auspiciousness, '*atha*' has, as a constituent of the sentence prescribing enquiry, a meaning other than auspiciousness.

[Traditional works commence with a *maṅgala*, an auspicious introduction in the form of an invocation. This is meant to remove impediments to the completion of the work and is explicitly included in the work itself to set an example to the pupils studying the text. It is said, "The word '*aum*' and the word '*atha*' are regarded as auspicious, for, in the beginning, they burst forth from the throat of Brahmā." The word '*atha*' can and does constitute the *maṅgala* of the *Brahmasūtra*-s. Auspiciousness is effected by the mere hearing or the utterance of that word.

The expressed or implied meaning of the word '*atha*' should syntactically relate to the meaning of the sentence, "*atha ataḥ brahmajijñāsā*." Here, 'auspiciousness' is not the meaning of the word '*atha*', for this meaning does not suitably fit in with the rest of the sentence. Indeed, if '*atha*' were to mean

'auspiciousness', the first aphorism would have the irrelevant import that the desire to know Brahman is practised, as it is auspicious. Hence, though effecting auspiciousness, '*atha*' has some other expressed or implied meaning.]

Among the meanings of '*atha*' enumerated in the *Amarakośa* lexicon, the sense of 'sequence' is appropriate in the first aphorism. There is a dictum that what sequentially follows something arises from the latter.

[The sequence referred to in the dictum is that of the primary kind in which no spatial or temporal interval separates the entities in question. It is between a cause and an effect that such immediate succession is seen. A pot arises from clay. There is no space separating the pot, the effect and the subsequent factor of the clay-pot pair, from clay, the cause and the antecedent factor. Further, the pot arises while the clay is present and not some time later. In the case of a sequence not involving causality, a spatial or temporal interval is encountered. Consider a cow going behind a horse on a path. There is a spatial gap between the two and, further, the cow crosses a point only a few seconds after the horse. The horse-cow succession is said to be secondary in view of the separation. As the maxim pertains to the primary kind of sequence, it is not contradicted by the fact that the cow sequentially follows the horse but, nonetheless, does not arise from the horse.

While establishing that '*atha*' has the sense of 'sequence' in the first aphorism, an objection that is dealt with in the sequel is, "The word '*atha*' is often used to differentiate what follows it from what preceded it. This is the sense in which '*atha*' is employed in the first aphorism. The performance of enquiry about Brahman is connoted by '*brahmajijñāsā*' and it is the result of something, its causative basis. That causative basis is the pertinent, antecedent factor that is differentiated by '*atha*' from the following enquiry about Brahman."]

As is understandable from the maxim, '*atha*' in the sense of 'sequence' inalienably relates to causality. So, it points to a pertinent, antecedent factor that is the causative basis of *brahmajijñāsā*. Moreover, being the cause, the antecedent factor must be one that is present whenever there is *brahmajijñāsā*. Thus, when '*atha*' is used in the sense of 'immediate succession', even the difference between *brahmajijñāsā* and the antecedent factor is readily discernible. The primary purpose of '*atha*' is, however, not the differentiation of *brahmajijñāsa* from what is pertinent and antecedent to it, namely its causative basis.

[Were '*atha*' merely meant to differentiate, it would be unapparent that the distinguished, antecedent factor is the causative basis of the performance of enquiry. After all, just because two entities are shown to be different, it does not follow that one of them is the cause of the other. Further, there is no benefit in merely differentiating *brahmajijñāsā* from its causative basis.]

When the ultimate sequence is considered (that is, when '*atha*' is taken to denote a primary sequence marked by causality and not merely a secondary sequence in which there is a spatial or temporal gap between the subsequent and antecedent factors), then '*atha*' fittingly applies only to that in whose presence, *brahmajijñāsā* definitely bears fruit and in whose absence, *brahmajijñāsā* does not fructify. That is none other than the tetrad of spiritual means comprising: (i) discrimination between what is eternal and what is impermanent, (ii) dispassion, (iii) the hexad of qualities such as control of the mind and (iv) the desire for liberation.

An objection is, "If rites were to yield only an impermanent fruit, one could become dispassionate towards such a result. However, some passages of the *śruti* reveal that the drinking of *soma* during a rite, the performance of the *cāturmāsya* sacrifice, etc., yield a permanent fruit. Hence, dispassion cannot arise towards such a fruit of rites, everlasting heavenly joy. Also, there

is no scope for the desire for liberation, characterised by the soul abiding in its intrinsic nature as Brahman, for the soul, which performs rites and attains their fruit, is not Brahman."

The word '*ataḥ*' has been used in the first aphorism to repudiate such an objection to the effect that none can possess the tetrad of spiritual means vital to fruitfully engage in *brahmajijñāsā*. The import of '*ataḥ*' (literally meaning 'therefore') is that the tetrad of spiritual means is indeed viable.

The *śruti* declares, "Just as in this world, the result of what is acquired through action perishes, in the very same way, the result acquired through virtuous deeds (such as sacrifices) comes to an end in the world attained after death (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VIII.1.6)." It makes known the inviolable rule that whatsoever is produced is impermanent. The *smṛti* conveys, "Persistence till the dissolution of the elements is spoken of as immortality (*Viṣṇu Purāṇa* II.8.95)." In keeping with the cited passages of the *śruti* and the *smṛti*, it can be understood that only relative permanence of the fruit is meant when the Veda says, "We have drunk *soma* and have become immortal (*Ṛg-veda-saṁhitā* VIII.48.3)" and, "The merit of the one who performs the *cāturmāsya* sacrifice is inexhaustible (*Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* II.6.3.1)." This apart, the scripture says, "The knower of Brahman attains the highest (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad* II.1.1)" and thereby conveys that the knowledge of Brahman results in liberation. So (as rites do not and cannot yield a truly permanent result and as knowledge by itself results in one's attaining the highest, that is, Brahman, and thus being liberated), dispassion towards the fruit of action and the desire for liberation characterised by abidance as Brahman are quite feasible.

In the manner considered, the first two words, '*atha ataḥ*', of the first aphorism convey, 'Following the attainment of the tetrad of spiritual means that are feasible'.

The third term '*brahmajijñāsā*' is a compound that is separable into its constituent words as: '*jijñāsā*', the desire to know, '*brahmaṇaḥ*', Brahman. Brahman is defined in the second aphorism as, "Brahman is that from which proceeds the origination, subsistence and the dissolution of the world (I.1.2)."

[The word '*brahmaṇaḥ*' is in the genitive case. The genitive case can signify relationship in general. If it does so here, '*brahmaṇaḥ*' would mean 'related to Brahman' and '*brahmajijñāsā*' would mean 'the desire to know all that is connected with Brahman'. Such an interpretation, which was advanced by a commentator who antedated Bhagavatpāda, is, however, unsatisfactory. What is principally desired to be known, Brahman, ought to be explicitly specified. That is not done if the genitive case is seen as signifying relationship. Moreover, what is secondary, that which is just related to Brahman, becomes specified as if it were what is primarily sought to be known. To avoid such unsatisfactory interpretations, it is necessary to settle the sense in which the genitive case is utilised here. This is done in the sequel. It is determined, first in the light of Sanskrit grammar and then by considering scriptural passages, that the genitive case has, in the present context, the sense of the accusative case and so '*brahmaṇaḥ*' means 'Brahman'.]

The word '*jijñāsā*' is a noun that is formed from the verbal root '*jñā*, to know,' by the addition of an affix termed '*san*', which carries the sense of 'desire'. Affixes that give rise to nouns from verbal roots are termed '*kṛt*' affixes; '*san*' too is a '*kṛt*' affix. As '*san*' is a '*kṛt*' affix, '*jijñāsā*' is a word that ends with a '*kṛt*' affix. The word '*brahmaṇaḥ*' that is in the genitive case is used with the word '*jijñāsā*' and, thus, is used with a word ending in a '*kṛt*' affix. There is a rule of Sanskrit grammar that, "A word that denotes the agent of an act or the object of an act is put in the genitive case when it is used along with a word that ends with a '*kṛt*' affix (*Pāṇini-sūtra* II.3.65)." So, the

genitive case of '*brahmaṇaḥ*' has the sense of the accusative case and '*brahmaṇaḥ*' means 'Brahman', the object sought to be known.

The scriptural passages considered by the first aphorism include: "Wish to know well that from which all these beings are born, by which they live after taking birth, towards which they proceed and into which they merge at the time of their dissolution. That is Brahman (*Taittirīya Upaniṣad* III.1.1)"; "My dear, the Self should be realised; It should be heard of, reflected on and firmly concentrated upon (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* II.4.5)"; and, "That Self should be known. That should be inquired into for realisation (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VIII.7.1)." From these, it is apparent that what should be known is Brahman. Accordingly, the genitive case must express here the sense of the accusative case and '*brahmaṇaḥ*' must mean 'Brahman'.

The word '*jijñāsā*' etymologically means 'the desire to know'. The affix '*san*' of the word expresses 'desire'. Knowledge that culminates in the direct realisation of Brahman is the object of the desire.

[In the Sanskrit text, the above paragraph comprises sentences that are reproduced from the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*. Thus, the words are those of *Bhagavatpāda*.

One cannot desire what is totally unknown. If there is to be a desire to know Brahman, there must first be knowledge of Brahman. However, if Brahman is already known, there cannot be the desire to know Brahman. That is why not mere knowledge but knowledge that culminates in realisation is said to be the object of the desire expressed by the '*san*' affix. Superficial knowledge of Brahman is the seed of the desire, while direct realisation is what marks the fulfilment of the desire.

Consider the statement, “He is going home.” The object of the verb ‘going’ is ‘home’, the destination. The result of the act of going is the person’s reaching home. Thus, the object and the fruit of ‘going’ are different. In the case of desire, the situation is dissimilar. The fruit itself is the object desired. For instance, the fruit had by a person on the consummation of his desire for heaven is his attainment of heaven. The person’s original wish is not for heaven per se but for his attainment of heaven. Thus, the attainment of heaven, the fruit, is itself the object of the desire. Here, knowledge culminating in the realisation of Brahman is the fruit. As the fruit and the object of desire are not disparate, realisation of Brahman, the fruit, is what is presented here as the object of the desire.]

Direct realisation of Brahman is the Brahman-consciousness that manifests and is characterised by the cessation of the veil of ignorance. It is the finale of a plenary mental mode that constitutes the non-relational, immediate knowledge of Brahman.

[Direct realisation is something that occurs. As such, it is not the eternal consciousness that is the very nature of Brahman. It is the pure consciousness that manifests in the plenary mental mode with Brahman as content. The *Parāśara Upapurāṇa* teaches, “From the declaration of the *Veda,* there arises a mental mode that has the unity of the individual self and Brahman for its content. In it, there is the manifestation of consciousness that is self-established and beneficent. That indeed is the realisation of Brahman. That is what destroys ignorance (XIV.33-35).”

An objection dealt with in the sequel is as follows. What everyone desires is happiness or the cessation of sorrow. The ultimate human objective is the attainment of eternal bliss or the absolute cessation of sorrow. The Vedānta-śāstra is concerned with liberation. So, eternal bliss or the absolute cessation of sorrow is what ought to have been presented in the aphorism as

the object of desire. On the other hand, the word '*jijñāsā*' is used and thereby knowledge is stated to be the object of the desire. Such knowledge that is a mental mode with Brahman as content is neither bliss nor the cessation of sorrow. So, it is unfit to be specified as the object of desire.]

In itself, this mental mode is neither bliss nor the absence of sorrow. However, it destroys the cause of all evils, ignorance that veils self-effulgent bliss, and manifests Brahman-consciousness. Since it manifests eternal and unsurpassable bliss and since, by eradicating ignorance, it is the cause of the absolute cessation of all sorrow, it can be regarded as the highest objective. To highlight this and because the object of a desire is the fruit aimed at, it was stated that the object of the desire expressed by the '*san*' affix of '*jijñāsā*' is 'knowledge culminating in direct realisation'. The *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* clarifies, "The direct realisation of Brahman is the highest objective of human life, for such realisation totally eradicates all evils such as ignorance which constitute the seed of transmigratory existence (I.1.1)."

[Thus far, the *san*-affix's primary sense of 'desire' has been considered. With '*jijñāsā*' meaning 'the desire for knowledge culminating in direct realisation', the overall import of the first aphorism is, "Following the possession of the tetrad of spiritual means that are feasible, there is the desire for knowledge culminating in the direct realisation of Brahman." This, however, cannot be the final import of the aphorism. If it were, there would be a mismatch between the aphorism and the scriptural passages that it deals with. While the passages prescribe enquiry, the aphorism would not be doing so. It would be merely making a statement about the occurrence of a desire. This issue is dealt with in the sequel.]

The scriptural passages that the first aphorism deals with specify that enquiry into Brahman should be done. So, for the sake of concord with the scriptural passages, the first aphorism

too must contain the portion, 'should be done'. As the phrase 'should be done' is not explicitly found, it is treated as incorporated into the aphorism from the scriptural passages.

[There is no text torture involved in assuming the word '*kartavyaḥ* (should be done)', for many are the aphorisms that indisputably require additional words to be brought in for completion. Similar is the case even with the aphorisms of Pūrvamīmāṁsā.

With the inclusion of 'should be done', the aphorism would be enjoining the desire to know Brahman. This, however, would be inappropriate. The reason is that a desire is not something that can be enjoined, unlike the performance of a rite or contemplation or enquiry. This point is dealt with in the sequel.]

The phrase 'should be done' that is added does not fit in with the portion 'the desire to know Brahman'. Hence, while the '*san*' affix of '*jijñāsā*' primarily denotes 'desire', it is understood in the secondary sense of 'enquiry' to which the desire leads.

[Where the primary meaning of a word is untenable in a sentence, its implied meaning is considered. One form of implication is called 'exclusive implication (*jahallakṣaṇā*)'. It is described thus in Bhagavatpāda's *Svātmanirūpaṇa*, "The literal meaning of a word is completely discarded and another meaning that is consistent with it is understood. This is exclusive implication (33)." Exclusive implication is illustrated in the *Svātmanirūpaṇa* by means of the sentence, "The hamlet (*ghoṣaḥ*) is on the Ganges (*gaṅgāyām*)." The hamlet cannot be on the waters of the river. Hence, the literal meaning, 'on the Ganges', is completely discarded and the implied sense, 'on the bank of the Ganges', is understood. The implied meaning ought to be one that is consistent with the primary meaning. Hence, 'in the desert' cannot, for instance, be the implied meaning of 'on the Ganges'.

In the present case too, what is resorted to is exclusive implication. The primary meaning, 'desire', is untenable and so the basic condition for considering an implied meaning is met. Herein, the primary meaning, 'desire', is dropped and the implied meaning, 'enquiry', is adopted. The desire to know Brahman results in enquiry about Brahman. This was stated to point out that the implied meaning, 'enquiry', is one that is duly consistent with the primary meaning.]

The overall import of the first aphorism is thus, "The qualified person who is endowed with the tetrad of spiritual means should perform enquiry into Brahman for attaining the realisation that terminates bondage."

Enquiry into Brahman results in the knowledge of Brahman. If the individual soul were different from Brahman, the soul's bondage cannot cease because of such knowledge. It can do so only if the soul is actually Brahman. The aphorism refers to realisation that terminates bondage. So, it indicates that the scriptural passages with which it deals prescribe enquiry whose subject matter is the identity of the soul and Brahman.

Next, for the soul to be Brahman and for its bondage to be removable solely by knowledge, its bondage must be a false superimposition, as brought out by scriptural declarations like: "The knower of the Self goes beyond sorrow (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VII.1.3)" and, "The enlightened one becomes freed from name and form (the creations of ignorance) (*Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* III.2.8)." So, the aphorism also indicates that the scriptural passages with which it deals prescribe enquiry whose utility is the removal of bondage.

Thus, the final ascertained position aphorised is that the scriptural passages such as, "My dear, the Self should be realised; It should be heard of, reflected on and firmly concentrated upon (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* II.4.5)" and, "That

Self should be known. That should to be inquired into for realisation (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VIII.7.1)" prescribe enquiry that does have a subject, the unity of the self and Brahman, and a utility, the removal of bondage.

Objection: The basis for establishing that the enquiry has the identity of the soul and Brahman for its subject matter and the eradication of bondage for its utility is that bondage in its entirety is a false superimposition. However, such a false superimposition is impossible. The Self is conscious and the non-Self is inert. The two are contradictory in nature like light and darkness. It is untenable that the Self can become identified with the non-Self and the non-Self with the Self. When these substantives themselves cannot become identified, a mixing up of their attributes, such as consciousness and inertness, is totally ruled out. Therefore, there can be no false superimposition of the kind presumed.

[For any false superimposition to occur, there must be a substratum. A snake is, for instance, falsely superimposed on a rope, the substratum. The water of a mirage is falsely superimposed on a desert, the substratum. In the sequel, the false superimposition of the non-Self on the Self is considered. The objector seeks to show that there is no possibility of the Self being the requisite substratum.]

Agency, the condition of being an enjoyer, etc., are stated to be the attributes of the non-Self. Since a mix up of the attributes of the non-Self and the Self is impossible, the superimposing of agency, etc., on the Self is unfeasible. So, the Self is not the substratum of false superimposition.

[A person who clearly knows a rope cannot mistake it to be a snake. Ignorance about the exact nature of a rope is a must for that rope to constitute the substratum of any false superimposition on it. In what follows, the case of the Self is considered.]

The Self is self-effulgent; It requires nothing else for its illumination. As such, there can be no ignorance in respect of It. Hence, the Self cannot constitute the substratum for false superimposition.

[For an entity to be misapprehended as something else, there must be some similarity between the two. An uncoiled snake is almost cylindrical in shape and so is a rope. This is a similarity between the two that plays a significant role in a person falsely superimposing a snake on a rope. In the absence of similarity, false superimposition does not occur. For instance, none mistakes a rope to be a firefly. The question of similarity between the Self and the non-Self is now taken up.]

The Self is bereft of constituents and is totally devoid of qualities. As such, there is no quality or anything else because of which the Self has any similarity with the non-Self. Hence, the Self cannot be the substratum of false superimposition.

[None mistakes an unseen rope to be a snake. The rope must be perceptible to a person for him to falsely superimpose a snake upon it. Thus, the substratum of a false superimposition must be something perceivable. It is pointed out in what follows that this criterion is not met in the case of the Self.]

The Self is not graspable by the senses. Hence, It cannot be the substratum of false superimposition.

[Consider a person misapprehending a shell as, "This is silver." For such a false superimposition of silver on the shell to occur, the person must have known silver earlier. On at least one earlier occasion, say when he was visiting a shop, he must have actually come across silver. He should have then had the right knowledge of it as, "This is silver." In this right knowledge, there is the proper identification of 'this', the substratum considered in general, and 'silver', a particular attribute. This right knowledge of silver would have produced a mental impression, the basis of

recollection. Subsequently, on the person's indistinctly seeing a shell that resembles silver in that it too is bright, this mental impression is triggered. He then misapprehends the shell as, "This is silver."

If the person did not know silver earlier, he could not have misapprehended the shell as, "This is silver." He could, however, have mistaken the shell to be something else that he had actually apprehended earlier and which the shell resembles.

In the case of the false superimposition of the non-Self on the Self, the requisite impression born of an earlier right knowledge of the non-Self is absent. If the non-Self alone, unidentified with the Self, were to have been the object of an earlier right knowledge, as in the case of the silver seen in the shop, then the non-Self would be real, like the silver in the shop. The formation of an impression born of the right knowledge of a real non-Self cannot be admitted by one who regards the soul as identical with Brahman and bondage to be removable solely by knowledge. It cannot even be contended that the requisite mental impression could have stemmed from a right knowledge had earlier of the identity of the non-Self and the Self. This is because only if there be real identity between the non-Self and the Self can there be any right knowledge of such identity. However, no real identity of the non-Self and the Self is admitted at all. As no requisite impression is available, the non-Self cannot be falsely superimposed on the Self. This is succinctly brought out in the sequel.]

In the world, the following is regarded as necessary for any false superimposition (like that of silver on a shell): the presence of an impression born of a right knowledge had earlier of what is superimposed. This right knowledge had earlier (such as, "This is silver") is of the identity of the substratum considered in general (say, as 'this') and a specific attribute of what is superimposed ('silver', for example). In the case of the false superimposition of the non-Self on the Self, there can be no such

impression born of an earlier right knowledge of what is superimposed. So, the Self cannot be the substratum of the false superimposition of the non-Self.

The existence of something is established by defining it and by some means of valid knowledge (such as perception or inference). As false superimposition is undefined and not revealed by any means of valid knowledge, it is unsubstantiated. When false superimposition is itself unproven, the subject matter of the identity of the soul and Brahman as also the utility of the removal of bondage become unfounded. Hence, the scriptural passages with which the first aphorism deals do not enjoin enquiry into Brahman.

Vedāntin's Rebuttal: Though the solar orb is fiercely fiery and bright, an owl experiences it as dark. [This example is based on an ancient belief that the owl, which is a nocturnal bird, sees clearly at night even when it is pitch-dark but finds everything shrouded in darkness during the day.] In like manner, an unenlightened person finds the ever self-effulgent Self veiled by ignorance. His experience of the form, "I am ignorant of the Self" establishes the veil of ignorance. This ignorance cannot be denied. Thus, ignorance of the true nature of the substratum, the Self, is decidedly present and this is one of the factors contributing to the false superimposition of the non-Self on the Self.

[The preceding paragraph refuted the objection that as there is no ignorance in respect of the Self, the Self cannot be the substratum of any false superimposition. The objection taken up in the sequel is that the non-Self cannot be falsely superimposed on the Self as there is no similarity between the Self and the non-Self.]

Space is formless and immaculate. Yet, undiscriminating persons ascribe to it pollution, the shape of a huge inverted bowl, a blue colour, etc. There is no similarity between space and what

is falsely superimposed upon it. Thus, similarity is not an invariable requirement for something to be the substratum of a false superimposition. Accordingly, lack of similarity between the Self and the non-Self is not a valid ground to contend that the Self cannot be the substratum of a false superimposition.

[The objection that is countered next is that as the Self is not perceivable by means of the senses. It cannot serve as a substratum.]

Space is not apprehensible by means of any of the senses. Nonetheless, as seen, it is a substratum on which pollution, etc., are falsely superimposed. Hence, it is unessential that the substratum of false superimposition must be perceptible. Accordingly, imperceptibility does not preclude the Self from being a substratum.

[The objection that is rebutted next is that as the Self and the non-Self are contradictory in nature like light and darkness, neither they nor their attributes can be falsely identified with each other.]

Space is formless, while dust has form. Being formless and being with form, the two are contradictory in nature. Nonetheless, dust-pollution is falsely superimposed on space. Likewise, though what is conscious and what is inert are contradictory in nature, they are nevertheless falsely identified. An unenlightened person has a notion such as, "Remaining in this house itself, I apprehend what is outside the window." It cannot be denied that he falsely unifies the Self and the non-Self. But for his falsely superimposing the body's attribute of being limited in size upon the Self, how could he have referred to the Self, which has no spatial limitation, as being located within the confines of a house? Likewise, without falsely superimposing the capacity to know that belongs to the Self upon the body, how could he have referred to the body, which is inert, as a knower? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the Self and the non-Self are

contradictory in nature, they and their attributes are falsely identified with each other.

[In the sequel, the objection refuted is that as there is no impression born of an earlier right knowledge, there can be no false superimposition of the non-Self upon the Self.]

At no time is there any right knowledge that reveals the pollution, bowl-like shape, blueness, etc., of space. So, there can be no impression born of such a right knowledge. Nonetheless, there is false superimposition of pollution, etc., on space. Thus, an impression that is born of an earlier right knowledge (like, "This is dusty") in which the substratum considered in general (say, as 'this') is identified with a specific attribute (such as dusty, bowl-like or blue) is not imperative.

For a false superimposition (such as that of pollution upon space), there should have somehow been some experience of the said identification. This is sufficient to produce the needed impression. The requirement of just an earlier experience of what is superimposed is not cumbrous like the requirement that there should have been an earlier right knowledge. The simpler but adequate condition is satisfied in the case of the false superimposition of the non-Self upon the Self. The present false superimposition is triggered by the impression born of the experience of an earlier false superimposition. The earlier false superimposition is triggered by the impression of an even earlier false superimposition. The sequence comprising the impression of an earlier false superimposition and a subsequent false superimposition is without any beginning in time.

As the requisite impression of an earlier false superimposition is available and as there is even some similarity in the purity, lucidity, subtlety, etc., of the Self and the intellect (which is able to bear a reflection of the Self), the superimposition of agency and the rest upon the Self cannot be challenged.

[It was objected that false superimposition is not revealed by any means of valid knowledge and so, is baseless. In the sequel, it is demonstrated that the objection is invalid. One is directly and immediately aware of one's happiness, sorrow, thoughts, sense of agency, ignorance, etc., even without recourse to any means of valid knowledge such as perception, inference or the scripture. In such cases, the apprehension is termed 'direct perception by the witness-consciousness (*sākṣipratyakṣa*)'. In the sequel, it is elucidated how 'direct perception by the witness-consciousness' reveals the false superimpositions of the body, senses, mind, vital air (*prāṇa*) and ignorance on the Self.]

There is indeed no need to look for a means of valid knowledge to establish false superimposition because it is immediately apprehended by the witness-consciousness. The false superimposition of the body and its attributes on the Self is patent in one's notions like: "I am a human"; "I am a Brahmin"; "I am born"; "I die"; "I am sick"; "I am stout"; "I am lean"; "I am fair"; "I stand"; "I go"; and, "I jump."

[The first two illustrations show the false superimposition of bodily generic attributes upon the Self. The next three instances that refer to birth, death and sickness bring out the false superimposition of the conditions through which the body passes. The sixth, seventh and eighth examples reveal the false superimposition of the size and complexion of the body on the Self. The last three instances highlight the false superimposition of the activities and inactivity of the body upon the Self.

One does not explicitly think, "I am the body." Nonetheless, one does erroneously identify the body with the Self. It is because of the identification of the body with the Self that the attributes of the body can be superimposed as if they are one with the Self.]

The false superimposition of the attributes of the senses is apparent in one's ideas such as: "I am dumb"; "I am impotent"; "I am deaf"; "I am one-eyed"; and, "I am blind."

[Dumbness pertains to the organ of speech and impotency to the organ of procreation. The first two instances reveal the false superimposition of the attributes of the organs of action. Deafness relates to the organ of hearing, while lack of vision in one eye and blindness relate to the organ of sight. The third, fourth and fifth examples show the false superimposition of the attributes of the organs of perception. Lack of vision in one eye is mentioned to illustrate the superimposition of partial sensory defects.

One does not spontaneously have notions such as, "I am the organ of speech" and, "I am the eye." Nevertheless, one does identify the organs of action and perception with the Self. It is the false superimposition of the senses on the Self that provides the basis for the false superimposition of the sensory attributes. Moreover, the superimposition of the senses precedes the superimposition of the body.]

The false superimposition of the internal organ and its attributes is clear from one's notions like: "I desire"; "I think"; "I resolve"; "I do"; "I believe"; "I doubt"; "I fear"; and, "I am ashamed."

[The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* says, "Desire, resolve, doubt, faith, lack of faith, steadiness, unsteadiness, shame, intelligence and fear are all but the mind (I.5.3)." Agency too belongs to the changeful internal organ and not to the changeless Self. The internal organ is falsely superimposed as being identical with the Self. That is why the Self is taken to be the 'I' that is the agent. With the false superimposition of the internal organ as basis, the attributes of the internal organ, such as desire, are falsely superimposed upon the Self.

The false superimposition of the internal organ makes possible the false superimposition of the senses, followed by the false superimposition of the body and then the attributes of the body.

The examples given up to now are mostly those reproduced from the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*.]

The false superimposition of the attributes of the vital air (*prāṇa*) is patent in one's ideas such as: "I am hungry"; "I am troubled by thirst"; "I exhale"; and, "I inhale." [Hunger and thirst are said to be the functions of the vital air, as are exhalation and inhalation.] The false superimposition of ignorance and the attributes of the effects of ignorance are seen in notions like, "I am dull."

Thus, 'immediate perception by the witness-consciousness (*sākṣipratyakṣa*)' establishes the false superimposition of the non-Self upon the Self.

['Immediate perception by the witness-consciousness' is the primary proof of false superimposition. Hereafter, it is shown how the possibility of false superimposition is evidenced by 'presumption (*arthāpātti*)' and by 'inference (*anumāna*)', which are means of valid knowledge. 'Presumption' (in particular, its subtype, 'presumption from what is seen') is taken up first. This means of valid knowledge was considered earlier in pages 32 and 33. After presenting how 'presumption' evidences false superimposition, it is demonstrated that all dealings, inclusive of those of the learned, are signs from which the presence of false superimposition can be inferred.]

During dreamless sleep, by virtue of the absence of false superimposition, there is no empirical dealing whatsoever. As all the forms of worldly and scriptural behaviour that are connected with means of valid knowledge would be inexplicable otherwise, one presumes the existence of false superimposition for such behaviour. Thus, 'presumption' evidences false superimposition.

As evidenced by 'direct perception by the witness-consciousness' and by 'presumption', during the states of waking and dream, there is false superimposition and there is

empirical behaviour. In deep sleep, false superimposition is absent and empirical behaviour too is not there. The presence and absence of empirical behaviour is thus contingent upon the presence and absence of false superimposition.

Not just the common folk but even persons who are proficient in discriminating, by means of the scripture and reasoning, what is inert (such as the body) from what is conscious are seen to strive to obtain what is beneficial and to ward off what is harmful. False superimposition, which is immediate, cannot be terminated by the mediate knowledge of the distinction between what is inert and what is conscious. Therefore, the scripture prescribes that even after hearing about the Self (*śravaṇa*) and then reflecting upon It (*manana*), one should practice profound meditation on the Self (*nididhyāsana*) to remove one's persisting erroneous notions. The cause of false superimposition is primal ignorance (*mūlājñāna*) and it does not cease until the occurrence of the plenary, direct realisation that stems from the scriptural declaration about the unity of the soul and Brahman. As for the functioning of even an enlightened person when he is not in *nirvikalpa-samādhi*, it is due to a trace of the false superimposition that has been destroyed by his direct realisation. Hence, all worldly behaviour without exception is a sign from which the existence of false superimposition can be inferred.

Thus, 'direct perception by the witness-consciousness', 'presumption' and 'inference' evidence false superimposition.

[It was objected that false superimposition lacks a proper definition. This objection is now shown to be unfounded. First, the varieties of false superimposition are listed and then they are accurately defined.]

False superimposition is of two kinds. These are, 'false superimposition that is of the form of an object (*arthādhyāsa*)' and, 'false superimposition that is of the form of knowledge (*jñānādhyāsa*)'.

[Consider a person erroneously cognising a shell as, "This is silver." This false apprehension is an instance of 'false superimposition that is of the form of knowledge'. According to the Advaitin-s, ignorance conjures illusory silver on the shell. This illusory silver is apprehended by the person as 'silver' along with the shell that is seen by him as just 'this'. The illusory silver, whose locus is the shell, is an instance of 'superimposition that is of the form of an object'.

The silver figuring in the false knowledge, "This is silver" cannot be non-existent. This is because what is non-existent cannot be seen but the silver is directly apprehended as present right in front. The silver is not real either. This is because it becomes sublated when the shell is correctly known. What is real cannot be sublated by right knowledge. The silver is thus neither real nor unreal; it is illusory. The illusory silver is a product of ignorance, its substratum is the shell and it is directly cognised by the person mistaking the shell to be silver.]

The definition of false superimposition in the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* is: *smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ.*

[This pithy definition comprises three words, the first and third of which are compounds. Each of the two compound words has two different, legitimate meanings, one pertaining to 'false superimposition that is of the form of an object' and the other to 'false superimposition that is of the form of knowledge'. When the word-meanings applicable to 'false superimposition that is of the form of an object' are considered, the overall import is, "False superimposition resembles a recalled object (*smṛtirūpaḥ*), is due to an object that was seen earlier (*pūrvadṛṣṭāt*) and is an object that is seen (*avabhāsaḥ*) in a locus wherein it is actually absent (*paratra*)." On the other hand, when the word-meanings pertinent to 'false superimposition that is of the form of knowledge' are considered, the overall import is, "False superimposition resembles recollection (*smṛtirūpaḥ*), is due to an earlier apprehension (*pūrvadṛṣṭāt*) and is the apprehension

(*avabhāsaḥ*) of an object in a locus wherein it is actually absent (*paratra*)."

The principal part of the definition is just, "False superimposition (that is of the form of an object) is an object that is seen (*avabhāsaḥ*) in a locus wherein it is actually absent (*paratra*)" or, "False superimposition (that is of the form of knowledge) is the apprehension (*avabhāsaḥ*) of an object in a locus wherein it is actually absent (*paratra*)." The remaining portion justifies the basic definition.

Hereafter, the definition provided by Bhagavatpāda is elucidated. Its three words and the constituents into which the compound words can be separated are analysed.]

When the definition pertains to 'false superimposition that is of the form of knowledge', the first word '*smṛtirūpaḥ*' etymologically means 'it is that whose character (*rūpa*) is akin to that of recollection (*smṛti*)'. The idea is, "False superimposition (that is of the form of knowledge) is that which has recollection's character of arising from a mental impression." The definition's third word, '*pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ*', can be separated into an abstract noun '*avabhāsaḥ*' meaning 'apprehension' and '*pūrvadṛṣṭāt*' meaning 'due to a cognition had earlier'. When the portions 'due to a cognition had earlier (*pūrvadṛṣṭāt*)' and 'that which has recollection's character of arising from a mental impression (*smṛtirūpaḥ*)' are seen together, the idea is, "False superimposition (that is of the form of knowledge) has recollection's character of stemming from an earlier experience through the medium of an impression."

[As can be noted, the earlier experience that produces the requisite impression is not required to be valid knowledge. This point was discussed in page 50.]

The definition's second word, '*paratra*', connotes 'in a locus wherein the object is actually absent'. Herein, 'object' refers to

the pertinent, erroneously cognised object, such as the silver of the shell-silver example. The third word's constituent, 'apprehension (*avabhāsaḥ*)', and the second word, 'in a locus wherein the object is actually absent (*paratra*)', together express, "False superimposition (that is of the form of knowledge) is the apprehension of an object in a locus wherein it is absent." When 'object' refers to silver and the locus is a shell, what is conveyed is, "False superimposition (that is of the form of knowledge) is the apprehension of silver in a shell wherein it is absent." Thus, in the shell-silver example, 'false superimposition that is of the form of knowledge' is the false knowledge, "This is silver." The overall import of the definition is, "False superimposition that is of the form of knowledge has recollection's character of stemming from an earlier experience through the medium of an impression and is the knowledge of an object in a locus wherein it is actually absent."

The application of the definition to 'false superimposition that is of the form of an object' is considered henceforth. The word '*smṛti*' stems from the verbal root '*smṛ*, to remember,' to which is added the affix '*ktin*'. As the affix '*ktin*' can express the object of the action denoted by the verbal root, '*smṛti*' can etymologically mean 'that which is recollected'. Accordingly, the definition's first word, '*smṛtirūpaḥ*', means 'having a character (*rūpa*) akin to that of a recollected object (*smṛti*)'. [In the previous interpretation,' *smṛti* denoted recollection and not the object recollected. Recollection is a form of knowledge and it stems from a mental impression. Thus, a recollected object is an object of knowledge that stems from an impression. This is referred to in what follows.] The idea is, "False superimposition (that is of the form of an object) has a recollected object's character of being the object of a knowledge arising from an impression."

The third word's constituent '*pūrvadṛṣṭāt*' now means 'due to what was apprehended earlier' (and not 'due to an earlier apprehension' as in the previous interpretation). When this is

considered along with the definition's first word, the import is, "False superimposition (that is of the form of an object) has a recollected object's character of being the object of a knowledge arising from an impression and is due to an object that was apprehended earlier."

When the definition applies to 'false superimposition that is of the form of an object', the constituent '*avabhāsaḥ*' of the third word means 'that which is seen' (and not 'apprehension'). The second word '*paratra*' connotes, as before, 'in a locus wherein it is actually absent'. These two words together convey, "False superimposition (that is of the form of an object) is an object that is seen in a locus wherein it is actually absent." Thus, in the shell-silver example, 'false superimposition that is of the form of an object' is the silver that is seen in the shell wherein it is actually absent.

[Consider a valid cognition, "The cloth is red." The objective content of this knowledge comprises the cloth, the red colour and the relation between the red colour and the cloth. The cloth, the principal element known, is the substantive (*viśeṣya*) and the red colour is an attribute (*prakāra*). The locus of the red colour is the cloth. Thus, in terms of the cognition, "The cloth is red", it can be said that its objective content's substantive, which is the cloth, is the locus of its attribute, the red colour. This is the case with such valid cognitions.

Now consider the erroneous cognition, "This is silver." Its objective content comprises the shell that is known without its specifics as 'this', the silver and the relation between the silver and the shell. Here, the substantive is the bare shell and the attribute is silver. However, silver, the attribute, is actually absent in the shell, the substantive. Thus, in terms of the cognition, "This is silver", it can be said that its objective content's substantive, the bare shell, is the locus of the absence of its attribute, the silver. Such is the case with erroneous cognitions. This is spoken of in what follows. A point of note is

that in the parlance of Nyāya, one just says, "The substantive (*viśeṣya*) and attribute (*prakāra*) of knowledge" rather than, "The substantive and attribute of the objective content of knowledge."]

When expressed in terms of knowledge, the import of what has been said is: 'False superimposition that is of the form of an object' is an attribute (say, silver) of the knowledge ("This is silver") whose substantive (the shell without its particulars) is the locus wherein that attribute (the silver) is absent.

[The literal meaning of '*paratra*', the second word of the definition, is 'elsewhere'. When told that an object appears elsewhere, one can understand that the object appears where it does not belong. Thus, the import of '*paratra*' was elucidated earlier as, 'in a locus wherein it (the object that is seen) is absent'. In the sequel, the elucidation is carried further to highlight the precision of the definition.]

It is insufficient to just say, "False superimposition (that is of the form of an object) is an object that is seen in a locus" and omit, "wherein it is actually absent." This is because the definition will then overextend even to cases where false superimposition is not generally admitted. For instance, smell genuinely has the earth for its locus. Yet, such smell does meet the requirement of the shortened definition by virtue of its being an object that is seen in a locus, the earth. To ward off such overextension, the definition must contain the portion, 'appears in a locus *wherein that object is actually absent*'. As the earth is not a locus wherein the smell, the object under consideration, is absent, the definition does not overextend to the smell.

Moreover, it should be noted that, "False superimposition is an object that is seen in a locus wherein it is actually absent" implies, "False superimposition is an object that is seen in a locus wherein it is actually absent *even when it appears as related to the locus*." Else, there will be the overextension of the

definition to cases such as a pot brought to a spot on the ground. Earlier, the pot was absent at that spot. Hence, that spot qualifies as a locus of the absence of the pot. On the pot being brought and placed there, the pot is an object that is seen at that spot. Thus, the pot is an object that is seen in a locus of the absence of the pot. Accordingly, the basic definition applies to the pot though the pot is not regarded as a false superimposition on the spot. To ward off such overextension of the definition, the definition is understood to have the portion, 'even while the object appears as related to the locus'. This portion requires the object to be related to a locus at the very time when it is actually absent in that locus. With this, the definition does not apply to the pot, for the pot's absence at the spot and the pot's connection with the spot are not simultaneous.

[Consider a monkey seated atop a tree. The relation between the monkey and the tree is conjunction (*saṁyoga*). This relation can be there between substances but it does not fully pervade the substances related. In the example considered, conjunction is present in that part of the tree which is in contact with the monkey. However, this conjunction is absent at the base of the tree. As there is conjunction in the upper part of the tree, the tree is a locus wherein conjunction appears. Nonetheless, because conjunction is non-existent at the base of the tree, the tree is a locus of the absence of conjunction. Thus, conjunction appears in a locus, the tree, wherein there is the absence of that conjunction. So, the definition, "False superimposition is an object that is seen in a locus wherein it is actually absent" applies to conjunction. However, the conjunction between a monkey and a tree is not thought of as a false superimposition. Hence, the definition overextends to conjunction and such else that do not fully pervade the substances wherein they are found. This issue is dealt with in what follows and it is shown how the definition does not actually suffer from the defect of such overextension.

Two technical terms of importance that figure in the sequel are: 'determinant (*avacchedaka*)' and 'that which is delimited by the

determinant (*avacchinna*)'. With respect to the same entity, a man who is a Brahmin, one could have the valid cognition, "The person is tall" or, "The man is tall" or, "The Brahmin is tall." As noted earlier, the principal element cognised is the substantive. In the cognitions being considered, the same being is seen but as delimited in different ways. When the cognition is, "The person is tall", its substantive is seen as delimited by the determinant 'personhood'. On the other hand, when the cognition is, "The man is tall", its substantive is apprehended as delimited not by 'personhood' but by the determinant 'manhood'. Next, when the cognition is, "The Brahmin is tall", its substantive is perceived as delimited not by 'personhood' or by 'manhood' but by 'Brahmin-hood (the generic attribute of Brahmins)'. In every such perception, the determinant is apprehended along with the substantive. As the determinants 'personhood', 'manhood' and 'Brahmin-hood' are different, the cognitions had with respect to the same entity are different.

Not just the substantive of a perception but also the attribute and the relation between the attribute and the substantive are seen together with their determinants. For instance, consider three cognitions had with respect to a man holding a bamboo staff: "The man with a bamboo", "The man with a staff" and, "The man with a weapon." In all these, the substantive is grasped as delimited by the determinant 'manhood'. However, the determinants of the attribute vary. In the first case, the attribute is seen as delimited by the determinant 'the condition of being a bamboo, bamboo-ness'. In the second case, the attribute is grasped as delimited by the determinant 'the condition of being a staff, staff-ness'. In the third case, the attribute is cognised as delimited by the determinant 'the condition of being a weapon, weapon-ness'. In all these three cognitions, the relation between the substantive and the attribute is perceived as delimited by the determinant, 'conjunction'.

With regard to the conjunction between the monkey and the tree, it is cognised in the tree as delimited by the exact portion of the

branch where the monkey is seated. After all, one sees the monkey as seated on a specific portion of a particular branch. On the other hand, the absence of conjunction in the tree is seen as delimited by another determinant such as the base of the tree. This is so, for one does apprehend that there is no monkey and no conjunction between a monkey and the tree at the base of the tree. Thus, different determinants are involved in the cognition of the presence of conjunction in the tree and in the cognition of the absence of conjunction in the tree.

Suppose a condition is laid down that for an object to be a false superimposition it must be seen in and yet be absent in a locus as delimited by one and the same determinant. Then, conjunction cannot be deemed to be a false superimposition merely because it is seen in one part of the tree while it is absent in another part of the tree. After all, as noted, different determinants are involved in the cognition of its presence and absence in the tree. All this is brought out in the sequel.]

It should be noted that, "False superimposition is an object that is seen in a locus wherein it is actually absent" even implies, "False superimposition is an object that is seen, *with the involvement of a single determinant*, in a locus wherein it is actually absent." Else, the definition will overextend to conjunction and such else that are present in only a part of a substance. Conjunction appears in something (say, a tree) that is in contact with something else (say, a monkey). However, there is a part of that thing (the base of the tree) wherein the conjunction (between the tree and the monkey) is non-existent. Thus, conjunction is seen in a locus wherein it is absent. Hence, conjunction satisfies the basic definition, "False superimposition is an object (conjunction) that is seen in a locus (tree) wherein it is actually absent." However, conjunction (such as between a monkey and a tree) is generally not deemed to be a false superimposition. This overextension is eliminated when the definition is expanded as, "False superimposition of an object is an object that is seen, *with the involvement of a single*

determinant, in a locus wherein it is actually absent." This is because the conjunction (between the monkey and the tree) appears in a locus (tree) as delimited by one determinant (the portion of the tree wherein the monkey is seated) but is absent in the locus (tree) as delimited by another determinant (say, the base of the tree).

When the implied portions are included, the basic definition becomes, "False superimposition is an object that is seen, *with the involvement of a single determinant*, in a locus wherein it is actually absent *even while it appears as related to the locus*." This does not overextend to smell on the ground, a pot brought to a particular spot and to conjunction and such else that pervade only a part of the substances where they are found.

Objection: The settled conclusion of Vedānta is that everything other than Brahman is a false superimposition on Brahman. So, conjunction and a pot brought to a spot are only false superimpositions. As such, the definition of 'superimposition that is of the form of an object' should apply to them. There is no defect of overextension involved in the definition applying to them. So, what justification is there for including, 'with the involvement of a single determinant' and, 'even while the object appears as related to the locus' in the basic definition in order to avoid overextension?

Reply: It is true that everything other than Brahman is false and so the basic definition, "False superimposition is an object that is seen in a locus wherein it is absent" is sufficient. However, according to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools, conjunction and a pot brought to a spot are objects of right knowledge; they are not false superimpositions. So, a person influenced by their tenets may mistakenly think as follows: "Conjunction extends to only a part of the substance in which it appears. Though it is real, just because it is absent in some other part of the substance in which it is seen, it falls within the scope of the definition, 'False superimposition is an object that is seen in a locus wherein it is

absent.' The case of the silver of the shell-silver example is itself on par with that of conjunction, for the silver is seen as related only to an aspect of the shell. Finally, the world is indeed real but just because it appears in only a part of Brahman, it satisfies, like real conjunction, the basic definition of false superimposition." It is only to prevent such misconceptions that the basic definition was clarified.

Conjunction is, in reality, absent in a substance with respect to the very determinant by which its presence therein is demarcated and that is why it is a false superimposition. This is what we would like to establish. [Thus, with regard to the conjunction between a monkey and a tree, our position is that this conjunction is, in reality, absent at the very portion of the tree where the monkey is seated and which is where the conjunction appears.] Hence, the definition does not suffer from the defect of showing what is already known (*siddhasādhana*), namely that conjunction pervades only a part of the substance wherein it is seen. Also, it does not establish what is undesirable (*anabhimatasiddhi*), namely that conjunction is to be regarded as a false superimposition only because it is present in just one portion of a substance.

[According to Vedāntin-s, when the being of an object is not different from that of a different object, the relation between the two objects is 'the relation of identity-in-difference (*tādātmya-sambandha*)'. The relation between an earthen pot and clay, its material basis, is identity-in-difference. This is because the pot has no existence distinct from that of clay. At the same time, the pot and clay are not absolutely identical. After all, potable water is kept in a pot and not in clay in general; a pot has a specific rotund shape but clay in general does not. So, the pot is not identical with clay and yet has no existence apart from clay. Accordingly, the relation between clay and the pot is, for Vedāntin-s, 'identity-in-difference'. The silver of the shell-silver example has no existence apart from that of the shell. Yet, the

silver is not absolutely identical with the shell. Thus, the relation between the silver and the shell is, for Vedāntin-s, 'identity-in-difference'. The relation of 'identity-in-difference' is referred to in the sequel.]

The definition under consideration is: "False superimposition is an object that is seen, with the involvement of a single determinant, in a locus wherein it is actually absent even while it appears as related to the locus." That to which the definition is sought to be applied constitutes the 'object' mentioned in the definition.

Consider the silver that is an attribute of the erroneous cognition, "This is silver." Through the relation of 'identity-in-difference', it appears in the shell as delimited by the 'this' aspect. However, even at that time, it is actually absent in the shell as delimited by the 'this' aspect. Thus, the definition does apply to the silver of the shell-silver example.

Next, consider bondage of the form of agency, the condition of being an enjoyer, etc. The bondage appears, through the relation of 'identity-in-difference', in the Self as delimited by selfhood. But, in reality, even when it does so, it is non-existent in the witness-consciousness as delimited by selfhood. Thus, the definition applies to such bondage.

The entire phenomenal world appears in Brahman, which is totally bereft of it. Thus, the definition applies to the phenomenal world. Accordingly, the world is a false superimposition.

[The definition given in the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* was elucidated so far. It was shown that when two different meanings of its first and third words are considered, the definition independently specifies 'false superimposition that is of the form of an object' and 'false superimposition that is of the form of knowledge'. Now, for the very first time in Vedānta literature, a definition is formulated that not only applies to the two forms of false

superimposition but also does not require that more than one meaning of any of its words be considered. This terse definition is replete with the technical terminology of Navya-Nyāya and comprises six compound words.

Consider the statement, "Sugar is sweet." This amounts to saying, "There is sweetness in sugar." The second form of expression is what is frequently encountered in Navya-Nyāya. Now, consider the statement, "The cloth is red." In the parlance of Navya-Nyāya, the statement becomes, "There is redness in the cloth." The expression, "There is sweetness in sugar" explicitly presents 'sweetness' as an attribute located in a substantive, 'sugar'. Likewise, "There is redness in the cloth" explicitly presents 'redness' as an attribute located in a substantive, 'cloth'. If an attribute is said to be located in a substantive, a legitimate question that arises is, "What is the relation between the attribute and the substantive, the locus?" Hence, for completeness, the relation between the attribute and the substantive must also be specified. The relation between sweetness and sugar and between redness and the cloth is, for the Advaitin-s, 'identity-in-difference (*tādātmya*)'; this relation was discussed on page 64. Thus, it is said that 'there is redness in the cloth through the relation of identity-in-difference' and 'there is sweetness in sugar through the relation of identity-in-difference'.

Anything that is characterised by an attribute through a relation is termed 'qualified (*viśiṣṭa*)'. Thus, sugar marked by sweetness through 'identity-in-difference' and the cloth characterised by redness through 'identity-in-difference' are both deemed 'qualified (*viśiṣṭa*)'. In view of the mode of expression discussed earlier, it can be said, "There is 'qualified-ness (*vaiśiṣṭya*)' in sugar that is characterised by sweetness through identity-in-difference" and, "There is 'qualified-ness (*vaiśiṣṭya*)' in the cloth that is characterised by redness through identity-in-difference." The concept of 'qualified (*viśiṣṭa*)' is normally presented, in Nyāya, in terms of knowledge. It is essential to consider this because the new definition of false superimposition is centred on

'qualified-ness (*vaiśiṣṭya*)' and involves factors connected with knowledge.

Consider the determinate cognition, "Sugar is sweet." As discussed earlier on pages 58, 60 and 61, the objective content of such an apprehension comprises a substantive (*viśeṣya*), which is the principal element known, an attribute (*prakāra*) and the relation (*saṁsarga*) between the attribute and the substantive; the condition of being a substantive, the condition of being an attribute and the condition of being a relation are each grasped as delimited (*avacchinna*) by a determinant (*avacchedaka*). While the substantive is one, there can be more than one attribute. In the cognition under consideration, the condition of being a substantive is grasped as delimited by 'the condition of being sugar, sugar-ness'. Had it been grasped as delimited by some other determinant, say 'the condition of being a substance, substance-ness', the cognition would have been, "The substance is sweet." The condition of being an attribute is grasped as delimited by 'sweetness'. The condition of being the relation between the attribute and the substantive is grasped as delimited by 'identity-in-difference'. Had the determinant been 'conjunction (*saṁyoga*)', which was touched upon on page 60, the cognition would have been, "Sugar is in contact with sweetness." Thus, the cognition, "Sugar is sweet" has a substantive whose condition is delimited by 'sugar-ness', an attribute whose condition is delimited by 'sweetness' and a relation whose condition is delimited by 'identity-in-difference' between the attribute and the substantive.

The object apprehended by a cognition that grasps a substantive, an attribute and the relation between the attribute and the substantive is termed 'qualified (*viśiṣṭa*)'. The cognition, "Sugar is sweet" is of this kind. Accordingly, its object, the sugar characterised by sweetness through a relation, is 'qualified'.

Next, consider the cognition, "The cloth is red." Here, the condition of being substantive is delimited by 'the condition of

being a cloth, cloth-ness'; the condition of being the attribute is delimited by 'redness'; and, the condition of being the relation between the attribute and the substantive is delimited by 'identity-in-difference'. As the cognition, "The cloth is red" is one that grasps a substantive, an attribute and a relation between the attribute and the substantive, its object, the cloth characterised by redness through a relation, is 'qualified'.

According to Vedānta, the Supreme Brahman is free from all attributes. Accordingly, It is not 'qualified'. Further, It is decidedly not a false superimposition. The phenomenal world is not devoid of every attribute. It is a false superimposition. Thus, what does not have any attribute -- the Supreme Brahman -- is not a false superimposition, while what does have an attribute through a relation -- the world -- is a false superimposition. Hence, anything's condition of having an attribute through some relation -- that is, its 'qualified-ness (*vaiśiṣṭya*)' -- could be used to characterise false superimposition. This is what is done in the present definition.]

A definition common to 'false superimposition that is of the form of an object' and to 'false superimposition that is of the form of knowledge' is: "False superimposition is anything's qualified-ness (*padārtha-viśiṣṭatva*)."

[The term '*padārtha*', translated here as 'anything', literally means 'anything denotable'; it can refer to a substance, a quality, an action, a relation or even an absence.

Saying that false superimposition is characterised by 'qualified-ness' will not suffice. Details need to be given so that it can be first seen that the definition is specifically and unambiguously applicable to known cases of false superimposition such as the silver and the erroneous cognition, "This is silver" of the shell-silver example. If bondage (of the form of agency, the condition of being an enjoyer, etc.,) that is falsely superimposed on the Self were considered, the definition must specifically apply to it.

It must apply specifically even to the erroneous notion that the Self has bondage. Ultimately, of course, it must apply to the entire world and to the apprehension of the world as existent, both of which are false superimpositions. The requisite clarification of the 'qualified-ness' that marks the two forms of false superimposition is provided in the remaining words of the terse definition.

Three important terms that explicitly appear in the remainder of the definition are 'substantive-ness (*viśeṣyatā*), 'attribute-ness (*prakāratā*)' and 'self-linking relation (*svarūpa-saṁbandha*)'; these shall be introduced now.

Consider the cognition, "The cloth is red." The relation between the cognition and its object is termed, in Nyāya, 'subject-object relationship (*viṣayaviṣayibhāva*)'. The aspect of the object that becomes connected with knowledge is termed 'object-ness (*viṣayatā*)' and the aspect of the knowledge that relates to the object is termed 'subject-ness (*viṣayitā*)'.

A question that can be asked is, "What is the relation between 'object-ness' and knowledge?" The answer is that 'object-ness' is itself the relation between 'object-ness' and knowledge. That is, 'object-ness' is a relation that links itself to knowledge. A relation that links itself to something is called 'self-linking relation (*svarūpa-saṁbandha*)'. About 'object-ness', Śrī Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya writes in his authoritative Navya-Nyāya work, '*Viṣayatāvāda* (Doctrine of 'object-ness')', "The 'object-ness' that is in a pot, etc., is a particular relation between itself and knowledge." Like 'object-ness', 'subject-ness' too is a 'self-linking relation'; 'subject-ness' links itself with the cognition, whose aspect it is.

As noted earlier, the objective content of an apprehension such as, "The cloth is red" comprises a substantive, an attribute and a relation between the attribute and the substantive. The 'object-ness' spoken of belongs to the cognised object taken as a unit.

The 'object-ness' that pertains to just the substantive (*viśeṣya*) is termed 'substantive-ness (*viśeṣyatā*)'. 'Substantive-ness' is but an aspect of the substantive; it is the aspect by which the substantive becomes linked to the cognition that grasps it. Next, the aspect of 'object-ness' that pertains to the attribute is termed 'attribute-ness (*prakāratā*)'. Śrī Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya writes, "Attribute-ness is a type of object-ness (*Anumiti*, *Gādādharī*)." 'Attribute-ness' is just an aspect of the attribute by which the attribute becomes connected with the cognition that grasps it. Like 'object-ness', 'attribute-ness' is a 'self-linking relation'.

A cursory look at 'substantive-ness', 'attribute-ness' and 'self-linking relation' has been taken. Now, the terms 'conditioner (*nirūpaka*)' and 'that which is conditioned (*nirūpya*) by the conditioner' shall be introduced. These too find a place in the definition.

There is correlation between the 'object-ness' of a cognised object on the one hand and the 'subject-ness' of the cognition on the other. Such should be the case since the form of knowledge depends upon the object known. Two technical terms used in Nyāya to express correlation are 'conditioner (*nirūpaka*)' and 'that which is conditioned (*nirūpya*) by a conditioner'. With them, it could be said, "The 'subject-ness' of knowledge is conditioned by the 'object-ness' of the object."

There is correlation even between the 'subject-ness' of knowledge and 'substantive-ness'. After all, the substantive is but a constituent of the object and 'substantive-ness' is the 'object-ness' that pertains to the substantive. With respect to the correlation between 'subject-ness' and 'substantive-ness', one could say, "The 'subject-ness' of a cognition (such as, "The cloth is red") is conditioned by 'substantive-ness'." Keeping in mind that in the case of the cognition, "The cloth is red", the substantive is delimited by 'cloth-ness', one should say, "The 'subject-ness' of the cognition is conditioned by 'substantive-ness' that is delimited by 'cloth-ness'." There is correlation not

only between the cognition's 'subject-ness' and 'substantive-ness' but also between 'subject-ness' and 'attribute-ness'. After all, like the substantive, the attribute too is a constituent of the object cognised and 'attribute-ness' is the 'object-ness' that pertains to the attribute. All this apart, there is correlation between 'substantive-ness' and 'attribute-ness'. To express all these correlations, the terms 'conditioner' and 'that which is conditioned' are used.

The relevance of 'substantive-ness', 'attribute-ness', 'conditioner' and 'conditioned' to false superimposition can now be seen briefly. It is established in Nyāya that an invalid cognition is one in which 'substantive-ness' is seen as correlated with 'attribute-ness' but the attribute is absent in the substantive. Consider the erroneous cognition, "This is silver" of the shell-silver example. Here, the shell is presented as the substantive; 'substantive-ness' is seen as delimited by the shell's 'this-ness'. Silver is presented as the attribute. The attribute is absent in the substantive; indeed, the shell does not contain silver. Now, 'substantive-ness' is the aspect of substantive by which the substantive becomes connected with the cognition and 'attribute-ness' is the aspect of the attribute by which the attribute becomes connected with the cognition. The 'substantive-ness' and 'attribute-ness' are seen here as correlated; were it not so, the 'this' and the 'silver' would not be apprehended as associated. Thus, the cognition, "This is silver" is one in which 'substantive-ness' is seen as correlated with 'attribute-ness' but the attribute is absent in the substantive.

With this background, the rest of the definition can be taken up. For convenience, only a segment or two shall be considered at a time. It was stated (*vide* page 68) that 'qualified-ness', the condition of being 'qualified', marks any false superimposition. As noted, a substantive in which there is an attribute through a relation is termed 'qualified'.

In what follows, it is pointed out that the 'qualified-ness' that characterises false superimposition involves 'attribute-ness' and relationship with 'attribute-ness'. In the case of false knowledge, there is correlation between 'attribute-ness' and 'substantive-ness'. This correlation too is mentioned.]

The 'qualified-ness' referred to is the state of being qualified by 'attribute-ness'; this 'attribute-ness' is conditioned by 'substantive-ness'. The state of being qualified by 'attribute-ness' is either through the relation of 'being a conditioner' or through the 'self-linking relation'.

[As noted a little earlier, in an erroneous cognition, 'substantive-ness' and 'attribute-ness' are correlated. This is explicitly stated here in the portion, "this 'attribute-ness' is conditioned by 'substantive-ness'." Next, the 'qualified-ness' that characterises the two forms of false superimposition is elucidated here as the state of being qualified by 'attribute-ness' through any one of two relations; either the relation of 'being a conditioner' or the 'self-linking relation'. Thus, it is conveyed that whatever is a false superimposition must have 'attribute-ness' through any one of the two relations specified. The first relation is involved in the case of false superimposition that is of the form of knowledge and the other is involved in the case of false superimposition that is of the form of an object.

In the case of false superimposition that is of the form of an object, 'attribute-ness' is located in the illusory object (such as the silver of the shell-silver example) through the 'self-linking relation'. In the case of false superimposition that is of the form of knowledge, there is 'attribute-ness' in the erroneous cognition (such as, "This is silver" of the shell-silver example) through the relation of 'being a conditioner'. That is, 'attribute-ness' and the false superimposition that is of the form of knowledge correlate; 'attribute-ness' is the conditioner and the false knowledge is 'what is conditioned'.

Consider the misapprehension of a shell as, "This is silver." 'Attribute-ness', as noted earlier, is an aspect of the attribute; its locus is the attribute. Further, the relation between 'attribute-ness' and its locus is the 'self-linking relation'. In the misapprehension, "This is silver", silver is what is presented as the attribute. Hence, 'attribute-ness' is located in this illusory silver through the self-linking relation. Accordingly, the portion of the definition which has been translated so far applies to the illusory silver, which is an instance of false superimposition that is of the form of an object. Its application to the erroneous cognition, "This is silver" can be considered now.

It was noted earlier that an apprehension's 'subject-ness' correlates with the cognised object's 'attribute-ness'; after all, an apprehension is determined by the object cognised. As 'subject-ness' is but an aspect of the cognition, cognition can be regarded as conditioned by 'attribute-ness'. That is, 'attribute-ness' has the relation of 'being a conditioner' with the cognition. Now, consider the erroneous cognition, "This is silver." 'Attribute-ness' is related to it through the relation of 'being a conditioner'. Thus, the portion of the definition which has been translated so far does apply to the erroneous knowledge, "This is silver", which is an instance of false superimposition that is of the form of knowledge.

To summarise, the import of the portion of the definition translated so far is: "Every false superimposition that is of the form of an object has 'attribute-ness' through the 'self-linking relation'. Every false superimposition that is of the form of knowledge has 'attribute-ness' through the relation of 'being a conditioner'. The 'attribute-ness' is conditioned by 'substantive-ness'."

Though the part of the definition seen so far fits both the forms of false superimposition, if the definition were to comprise only this much, it would overextend even to cases where there is no false superimposition. This is because while it has been pointed

out that 'attribute-ness' is conditioned by 'substantive-ness', it has not been made out that the attribute (such as the silver of the shell-silver example) is absent in the substantive (such as the shell). The absence of the attribute in the substantive is what demarcates a false cognition from a valid one; the correlation of 'substantive-ness' and 'attribute-ness' is there even in the case of valid knowledge. So, in the remaining portion of the definition, it is specified with precision that the illusory object (such as the silver of the example) taken up for consideration appears in the substantive but is, at that very time, absent there. The approach adopted consists in suitably describing the 'substantive-ness' by which the 'attribute-ness' is conditioned. How this is done shall be outlined now.

'Substantive-ness', which is but an aspect of the substantive, is presented in an apprehension as delimited by a determinant. This determinant is some property of the substantive. For instance, in the valid knowledge, "The cloth is red", the determinant is the cloth's 'cloth-ness'; in the valid knowledge, "Caitra cooks rice", the determinant is Caitra's 'caitra-ness'; in the false knowledge. "This is silver", the determinant is the shell's 'this-ness'; in the false knowledge, "The sky is blue", the determinant is the sky's 'sky-ness'. Accordingly, it is stated in the definition that the 'substantive-ness' (by which the 'attribute-ness' is conditioned) is delimited by a 'property (*dharma*)'. To show that the illusory entity (such as the silver) in question appears in but is absent in the substantive, it is first stated that the said 'property (*dharma*)', the determinant, is qualified by the illusory entity. If it is to be so qualified, there must be some relation between the illusory entity and the 'property'. Two relations are specified and required to be simultaneously applicable; one establishes the appearance of the illusory entity in the said 'property' and the other establishes the non-existence of the illusory entity in the said 'property'.

In what follows, it is stated that the 'substantive-ness' is delimited by a 'property' and that the 'property' is qualified by the illusory object taken up for consideration.]

The said 'substantive-ness' is delimited by a 'property (*dharma*)' that is qualified by the object to which the definition is being applied.

['The property is qualified by the illusory object' means, in the parlance of Nyāya, 'the property is the locus of the object through some relation'. A pair of relations is specified in the sequel. The technical terms that are pertinent to the specification can be seen first.

Two technical terms that are employed in Nyāya with respect to any relation and, in a different sense, with respect to non-existence are '*pratiyogin*' and '*anuyogin*'. As applied to any relation, the term '*pratiyogin*' etymologically means 'that which is the preceding (*prati*) member of the relation (*yoga*)'. With reference to any relation, the term '*anuyogin*' etymologically means 'that which is the subsequent (*anu*) member of the relation (*yoga*)'. If some relation relates a thing to another, the former thing is the '*pratiyogin*' of that relation and the latter thing is the '*anuyogin*' of that relation. Consider the statement, "Daśaratha is the father of Rāma." Here, Daśaratha is the '*pratiyogin*' of the relation 'is-the-father-of' and Rāma is the '*anuyogin*' of that relation.

When one considers a relation between something that is present in a locus and the locus, the '*pratiyogin*' of the relation is the thing that is present in the locus and the '*anuyogin*' is the locus. Consider the sentence, "There is sweetness in sugar through the relation of 'identity-in-difference'." Here, the '*pratiyogin*' of the relation of 'identity-in-difference' is 'sweetness' and the '*anuyogin*' is 'sugar', the locus. Next, consider the sentence, "Fire is the cause of smoke." This, in Nyāya, is expressible as, "Fire has smoke through the relation of 'being-the-cause'." From the second form of expression, it is apparent that the '*anuyogin*' of the relation of 'being-the-cause' is fire, the locus; the '*pratiyogin*' is smoke. In view of what has been seen, as applied to the relation between what is referable as present in a locus and

the locus, '*anuyogin*' means 'locus'. For convenience, '*pratiyogin*' shall be translated as 'abider'; this is done keeping in mind that the '*pratiyogin*' of interest is presented as abiding in the locus.

Consider the sentence, "There is fire on the mountain through 'conjunction'." The '*anuyogin*' of the relation of 'conjunction' is the mountain, the locus. The '*pratiyogin*' is fire. A question that can be asked is, "Is the whole of the mountain fiery or is there fire only on some portion?" For accuracy, this information must be provided. It is done, in Nyāya, through the use of a technical term, '*anuyogitā*, locus-ness'; this term explicitly figures in the definition. '*Anuyogitā*, locus-ness' is the condition of being a locus and it is there in exactly what all can be the '*anuyogin*, locus'. The exact boundary of the '*anuyogin*, locus' is specified by presenting the '*anuyogitā*, locus-ness' as delimited by an appropriate determinant. In the case of the fire on the mountain, if the 'locus-ness' were specified as delimited by 'mountain-ness' then it would mean that the whole mountain is fiery. On the other hand, if the 'locus-ness' were specified as delimited by 'peak-ness', it would mean that the fire is only on the peak.

Consider the sentence, "There is sweetness in sugar through the relation of 'identity-in-difference'." Here, if sugar in general were meant, the 'locus-ness' must be specified as delimited by 'sugar-ness', which is there in all sugar. On the other hand, if a particular cube of sugar were meant, the 'locus-ness' must be specified as delimited by 'this-cube-of-sugar-ness', which is there only in the particular cube of sugar.

Now, consider the misapprehension of a shell as, "This is silver." The substratum of the illusory silver is the shell as delimited by the shell's 'this-ness'. The relation between the illusory silver and the shell's 'this-ness' is 'identity-in-difference'. The '*pratiyogin*, abider' of the relation of 'identity-in-difference' is the silver. The '*anuyogin*, locus' is basically the shell. To be precise like in the case of the fire on the mountain and the

sweetness in sugar, the '*anuyogitā,* locus-ness' must be specified as delimited by 'this-ness'.

If one were to say that the silver of the shell-silver example qualifies something, it would amount to saying, in the parlance of Nyāya, that the silver is located in that thing through some relation. Suppose one wants to convey even without explicitly mentioning 'this-ness' that the thing in which silver appears is the shell's 'this-ness'. Then, one could take advantage of the fact that it is the shell's 'this-ness' alone that has the state of being the determinant that precisely delimits the 'locus-ness'. Hence, in the light of what was seen in the preceding paragraph, one could say the following: "Silver is located in that thing (the 'this-ness') which has the state of being the determinant that delimits the 'locus-ness' of the relation between silver and that thing ('this-ness')."

It may seem that there is no purpose served in not mentioning 'this-ness' explicitly. However, such is not the case. The apparently convoluted presentation has the great advantage that it can apply to any illusory object, whether it is the silver of the shell-silver example or the blue colour that is falsely superimposed on the sky or the agency that is falsely superimposed on the Self or the entire world, which is falsely superimposed on Brahman. For instance, consider the misapprehension, "The sky is blue." When it is said that the blue colour qualifies some thing, it amounts to saying that that thing is the locus of the appearance of the blue colour through some relation. The sky's 'sky-ness' becomes specified as the locus when the word 'silver' is replaced by 'blue colour'. With the replacement, what is conveyed is: "Blue colour is located in that thing (the 'sky-ness') which has the state of being the determinant that delimits the 'locus-ness' of the relation between the blue colour and that thing ('sky-ness')."

With this background, the next segment of the definition can be taken up. As seen (*vide* page 75), the definition mentions a

'property (*dharma*)' that is qualified by the object to which the definition is being applied. This 'property (*dharma*)' is none other than the shell's 'this-ness' when the silver of the shell-silver example is the illusory object considered. It is the sky's 'sky-ness' when the blue colour that is falsely superimposed on the sky is the illusory object under consideration. It is 'Self-ness' when the agency that is superimposed on the Self is the object under consideration. By specifying that the 'property' is qualified by the illusory object under consideration, the definition reveals that that 'property' is the locus of the illusory object through some relation. As mentioned earlier (on page 75), the definition shall specify a pair of relations that must be simultaneously applicable. One of the relations points to the appearance of the illusory object in the 'property'; the other relation points to the absence, at that very time, of the object in the 'property'. The first of these relations is specified in what follows; it is none other than what was just discussed.]

The object under consideration (such as the silver of the shell-silver example) resides in the 'property (*dharma*)' (the shell's 'this-ness') through a pair of relations. The first of these relations is that the 'property' (the shell's 'this-ness') has the state of being the determinant that delimits the 'locus-ness (*anuyogitā*)' of the relation whose 'abider (*pratiyogin*)' is the object under consideration (the silver).

[The above segment of the definition caters to the appearance of the illusory object in the 'property'. All that remains to be done in the definition is to specify the second relation that points to the illusory object being non-existent in the 'property (*dharma*)' at the very time that the object appears.

The concept of 'non-existence (*abhāva*)' is, in Nyāya, complex and involves several factors. A few of them can be touched upon now. Consider the statement, "There is no pot on the ground at this spot." What is absent? The answer to this question is termed, '*pratiyogin*'; the '*pratiyogin*' considered earlier pertains to

relations and that is what figures in the definition. Here, the '*pratiyogin*' of the absence is 'pot'. Unlike the other '*pratiyogin*' that was translated as 'abider', this one could be translated as 'counter-positive'. Another question related to the absence is, "What delimits the 'condition of being the counter-positive (*pratiyogitā*)'? The statement under scrutiny does not convey that one particular pot is non-existent. Rather, it points out that no pot whatsoever is present at that spot. Hence, the determinant that delimits the 'condition of being the counter-positive' is 'pot-ness', the characteristic of all pots.

Another important question about the non-existence is, "Where is the pot non-existent?" The answer to this question is termed '*anuyogin*'; as before, it means 'locus'. Here the '*anuyogin*, locus,' is the ground. The fourth question about the absence is, "What delimits the '*anuyogitā*, locus-ness'?" Were the determinant that delimits the 'locus-ness' of the absence to be 'ground-ness', it would mean that there is no pot anywhere on the ground. The statement under scrutiny conveys that the absence is at 'this spot'. Hence, the determinant that delimits the 'locus-ness' of the absence is 'this-spot-ness'.

If a pot is kept on a spot on the ground, the relation between the pot and that spot is 'conjunction'. The relation between the non-existence of the pot and that place is decidedly not 'conjunction'. It is deemed, in Nyāya, to be the 'self-linking relation (*svarūpa-saṁbandha*).

Now, consider the misapprehension of a shell as, "This is silver." The delineation of the non-existence of the silver in the shell's 'this-ness' can be done in the following way. One starts with the silver, the illusory object under consideration. Next, one considers the non-existence of this silver. About the non-existence, one specifies that it is concurrent with the appearance of the silver. This is done to ensure that the silver is non-existent in the shell's 'this-ness' at the very time that the silver appears there. Then one considers the relation between the silver's non-

existence, which is concurrent with the appearance of the silver, and the locus of the non-existence. This relation is the 'self-linking relation'. The 'abider (*pratiyogin*)' of the relation is the silver's non-existence. The '*pratiyogin*' being spoken of here is the one pertinent to relations. The 'locus (*anuyogin*)' of the relation is basically the shell. To be precise, it must be said that the 'locus-ness (*anuyogitā*)' is delimited by the shell's 'this-ness'.

The approach here is akin to that adopted in the case of the first relation and discussed on page 77. When that is kept in mind, it can be readily discerned from the preceding paragraph that: "The shell's 'this-ness' has the state of being the determinant that delimits the 'locus-ness' of the relation between the silver's non-existence, which is concurrent with the silver, and the locus of the non-existence."

Suppose one wants to convey even without explicitly mentioning 'this-ness' that the thing in which there is the absence of silver is the shell's 'this-ness'. Then, one could take advantage of the fact that it is the shell's 'this-ness' alone that has the state of being the determinant that precisely delimits the 'locus-ness'. Hence, in the light of what was seen in the preceding two paragraphs, one could say the following: "The locus of silver's non-existence, which is concurrent with the silver, is that thing (the 'this-ness') which has the state of being the determinant that delimits the 'locus-ness' of the relation between the silver's non-existence and that thing ('this-ness')."

As noted in connection with the first relation, such a convoluted presentation has the advantage that it can apply to any illusory object that is taken up for consideration. In what follows, the definition specifies the second relation; this relation is none other than what was just discussed. A portion of the definition mentioned earlier is repeated in the translation below just for the convenience of perusal and completeness.]

The object under consideration (such as the silver of the shell-silver example) resides in the 'property (*dharma*)' (the shell's 'this-ness) through a pair of relations. The second of these relations is that the 'property' (the shell's 'this-ness') has the state of being the determinant that delimits the 'locus-ness (*anuyogitā*)' of the relation whose 'abider (*pratiyogin*)' is the non-existence of the object under consideration (the silver), the non-existence being concurrent with the object (silver).

[This segment of the definition establishes that the illusory object under consideration is absent in the locus wherein it appears and that too at the very time of its appearance.

In the sequel, the shell-silver example is utilised to show how the definition applies to false superimposition that is of the form of an object and to false superimposition that is of the form of knowledge. The application of the definition to this example has already been shown in the notes, in parts. Hence, in what follows, no detailed notes are given. Another reason for giving just the translation is to draw attention to the highly technical nature of the definition, which consists of just six compound words.]

Suppose the object under consideration is the silver (of the shell-silver example). The shell's 'this-ness' has the state of being the determinant of the 'locus-ness' of the relation of 'identity-in-difference' whose 'abider' is the silver. Likewise, the shell's 'this-ness' has the state of being the determinant of the 'locus-ness' of the 'self-linking relation' whose 'abider' is the non-existence of the silver, the non-existence being concurrent with the silver. In the case of the knowledge, "This is silver" there is the shell's 'substantive-ness' that is delimited by the 'this-ness' qualified by the silver through the aforesaid pair of relations. The 'attribute-ness' conditioned by the specified 'substantive-ness' is in the knowledge, "This is silver" through the relation of being a conditioner. (Thus, the definition applies to the erroneous knowledge, "This is silver", which is a false

superimposition that is of the form of knowledge.) The 'attribute-ness' conditioned by the specified 'substantive-ness' is in the silver through the 'self-linking relation'. (Thus, the definition applies to the illusory silver, which is a false superimposition that is of the form of an object.)

[The various Indian philosophical schools explicate not only right knowledge such as, "This is a shell", but also erroneous knowledge such as, "This is silver." An objection responded to in the sequel is: "Different schools view superimposition divergently. Such being the case, why should the definition of false superimposition given in the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* be deemed well-founded?"]

There is difference of opinion among the various schools about the intrinsic nature of the substratum and the intrinsic nature of what is superimposed. Nonetheless, all schools agree with the basic definition given in the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* that, "False superimposition is the apprehension (*avabhāsaḥ*) of something in a locus wherein it is absent (*paratra*)." As regards the divergent views about false superimposition, it is said: "Five theories of (erroneous) apprehension (*khyāti*) are: 'Apprehension of the self (*ātma-khyāti*)'; 'Apprehension of what is non-existent (*asat-khyāti*)'; 'Non-apprehension (*a-khyāti*)'; 'Apprehension as otherwise (*anyathā-khyāti*)'; and 'Apprehension of what is indescribable as real or as non-existent (*anirvacanīya-khyāti*)'."

[The Advaitin-s subscribe to 'Apprehension of what is indescribable as real or as non-existent (*anirvacanīya-khyāti*)'. In the erroneous cognition, 'This is silver', what is apprehended as 'silver' is, as noted earlier, something that is neither real, for it is sublated by right knowledge, nor non-existent, for it is directly perceived. With the exception of 'Apprehension of what is indescribable as real or as non-existent', all the other theories have been shown, in authoritative texts of Advaita-Vedānta, to be quite defective.

The theory of error accepted by the adherents of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika and the followers of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṁsā is 'Apprehension as otherwise (*anyathā-khyāti*)'. Consider the erroneous knowledge, "This is silver." On account of some defect in the organ of sight or in the specific situation in which the perception arises, the distinctive features of the shell are missed out. The shell is perceived as just 'this'. This perception of the shell is had through the normal contact of the organ of sight with the shell. The whiteness and brightness that are common to the shell and silver remind the perceiver of the silver seen by him at some earlier time in some other place such as a shop. With memory constituting a special relation, the silver's characteristics come within the scope of the organ of sight. The organ of sight, which is seeing the shell as 'this' in the normal way, grasps the silver that is elsewhere by a supernormal perception. This is the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika view, according to which the shell and the silver figuring in the erroneous cognition, "This is silver" are both real. The theory of error is termed 'Apprehension as otherwise (*anyathā-khyāti*)' for, in the words of Śrī Vācaspati Miśra, "One reality is mistaken for another reality."

The Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṁsā is largely in agreement with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position but rejects the extraordinary connection between the organ of sight and silver. Also, it regards the relation between the 'this' of the shell and the silver as one of absence.

'Apprehension of what is subjective (*ātma-khyāti*)', 'Apprehension of what is non-existent (*asat-khyāti*)' and 'Non-apprehension (*a-khyāti*)' are explicitly dealt with in the sequel.

What shall be taken up first is 'Apprehension of the self (*ātma-khyāti*)'. The Buddhist idealists, known as Yogācāra-s or Vijñānavādin-s, subscribe to this theory of error. They do not admit the existence of any object apart from the apprehension

thereof. It is cognition itself that appears, like in a dream, as the knower, the means of knowing and the object known. Cognitions are momentary. The self (*ātman*) is nothing over and above such momentary ideas. Past impressions (*vāsanā*-s) are responsible for the diversity in the cognitions. The silver of the apprehension, "This is silver" is only a thought and as such is within the perceiver. It is erroneously seen as though it were an external object. The silver that is an internal cognition is what is superimposed on the shell outside.

For the Buddhist idealist, cognition is the self (*ātman*) and what is superimposed and seen as something external, such as the silver of the shell-silver example, is a specific cognition. Thus, a feature of the self is what is erroneously seen as an external entity. Accordingly, this theory of error is termed 'Apprehension (*khyāti*) of the self (*ātman*)'.]

The Yogācāra, Buddhist idealist, subscribes to 'Apprehension of the self (*ātma-khyāti*)'. According to him, the self (*ātman*) is of the nature of cognition. The silver of the shell-silver example is just a feature of cognition and is something within the perceiver of the shell. It is, however, erroneously superimposed on the shell that appears outside. The *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* says, "Some speak of misapprehension as the superimposition 'elsewhere (*anyatra*)' 'of the attribute of another (*anyadharmasya*)'." As applied to the Buddhist idealist and the shell-silver example, 'elsewhere' of the sentence connotes 'on the external shell' and 'of the attribute of another' connotes 'of the internal silver that is an attribute of the self, which is of the nature of cognition'. The sentence thus means, "Some, the Buddhist idealists, speak of misapprehension as the superimposition on the external shell of the internal silver that is an attribute of the self, which is of the nature of cognition."

[The sentence of the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* just considered can aptly apply even to 'Apprehension as otherwise (*anyathā-khyāti*)'. However, this has not been taken up here as the theories

of error are being explained in the order in which they were listed in the passage cited earlier. The theory of error listed second and what is taken up next is 'Apprehension of what is non-existent (*asat-khyāti*)'. Buddhist nihilists, known as Mādhyamika-s or Śūnyavādin-s, contend that the silver of the shell-silver example is something totally non-existent. There is no silver at all in the place where the silver is seen and as such there is no contact of the organ of sight with it. The shell too is non-existent and thus there is actually no substratum. Emptiness first appears as a shell and then the shell is apprehended as silver. An example given by the Buddhist nihilist for the appearance of what is non-existent is the experience of a bright, woolly mass when the eyes are closed and an eyeball is pressed. The appearance of the silver is due to the capacity of the erroneous apprehension itself (*jñānasāmarthya*), functioning in accordance with the apprehension's own impressions (*vāsanā*-s). The above account is based on the expositions of the position of the Buddhist nihilists in the *Nyāyamakaranda* and the *Ṛju-vivaraṇa.*

Thus, according to the Buddhist nihilist, non-existent silver is fancied on a substratum, a shell, which itself is actually non-existent. The silver can be deemed to be a 'contrary attribute' of the substratum in that it is a non-existent feature. Hence, it could be said that for the Buddhist nihilist the superimposition of one thing on another is the fancying on a substratum of a contrary attribute.]

The Śūnyavādin, the Buddhist nihilist, subscribes to 'Apprehension of what is non-existent (*asat-khyāti*)'. He says that there is the apprehension of absolutely non-existent silver on a substratum. It is said in the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*, "Others, however, say that when there is the superimposition on one thing of another, the former is fancied as having a contrary attribute." Here 'superimposition on one thing' connotes, with reference to the shell-silver example, 'superimposition on a shell'; 'of another' connotes 'of silver'; 'the former is fancied' connotes,

'the shell that is the substratum is fancied'; and 'as having a contrary attribute' connotes 'as having a totally non-existent attribute, as having the absolutely non-existent silver as attribute'. The sentence thus conveys, "Others, the Buddhist nihilists, say that when there is the superimposition on a shell of silver, the shell that is the substratum is fancied as having the character of absolutely non-existent silver."

[The theory of error taken up next is 'Non-apprehension (*a-khyāti*)'. This is the position of the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṁsā. The Prābhākara-s hold that all knowledge is valid. If cognitions can be erroneous, one would be assailed at every stage by a doubt whether one's perception is true or false. Such a doubt would paralyse human activities. There is, however, no cognition that is false. Knowledge, which is ever valid, is of two kinds: perception and memory. Consider the shell-silver illusion. Even here, there is no false knowledge. First, just the 'this' aspect of the shell is apprehended. This is perceptual knowledge because it stems from the contact between the organ of sight and the shell that lies in front of the perceiver. It is valid too; what is perceived is the 'this' aspect and this is perceived correctly. Just because other aspects are not grasped, what is perceived does not become erroneous. Next, silver that was known earlier through valid perception is recalled; the similarity between the shell and the silver is a trigger for this recollection. The location of that silver and that it was seen in the past are, however, omitted in the recollection. The recollection is valid. Omission of the location and the past time does not make the recollection of silver erroneous.

There is no single cognition, "This is silver." On the other hand, two successive valid cognitions are involved, the first being the perception of the 'this' aspect of the shell and the second being the recollection of just the silver. Yet, as if there were a single cognition, there is the usage, "This is silver." This usage is what characterises illusion. The error is rooted not in the two apprehensions but in one's failing to grasp the distinction

between the perception and the recollection and between the objects of perception and recollection. Accordingly, this theory of error is termed 'Non-apprehension (*a-khyāti*)'.

The Prābhākara-s hold that all cognitions lead to activity. Suppose what lies in front of a person is a shell and he fails to distinguish his perception of its 'this' aspect and his recollection of silver. The non-discrimination results in the usage, "This is silver" and activity; the person moves to take the silver. When he grasps the object in front of him, he finds it to be only a shell and not silver. His activity thus turns out to be futile. While all cognitions, without exception, are valid, illusions are involved in the case of those cognitions that do not lead to activity that is fruitful. Cognitions that lead to fruitful activity are free of error. Thus, for the Prābhākara-s, the test of an illusion is purely pragmatic.]

The Prābhākara-s subscribe to 'Non-apprehension (*a-khyāti*)'. According to them, all knowledge is valid. In the illusion, "This is silver", there is the perception of the shell lying in front as 'this' and the recollection of the silver seen earlier as just 'silver'. Because of the non-apprehension of the difference between the two forms of knowledge and between their objects, activity occurs. It is only the non-apprehension of the distinction between what is at hand (the shell) and what is desired (the recalled silver) that effects the action to take possession of the silver.

[An objection considered in what follows is: "When something attainable is known and desired, one acts to gain it. Absence of knowledge does not initiate activity; knowledge does. Thus, absence of awareness of the distinction between two cognitions cannot be the cause of specific activity. Such being the case, it is futile to postulate the absence of awareness of the distinction between two cognitions to account for specific activity such as proceeding to take possession of what is at hand."]

Objection: It is pointless to admit non-discrimination between two apprehensions.

[The position of the Prābhākara-s is that non-discrimination between two cognitions is not non-existence of knowledge. In dreamless sleep, there is absence of knowledge, but no illusion. On the other hand, non-discrimination results in illusion.

Non-discrimination should be admitted as it allows the specification within a common framework of what effects activity when there is no error and when there is error.

Consider an error-free cognition of something 'qualified'. For instance, consider the cognition, "The man with silver." The man is presented here as the substantive and silver as the attribute; the relation between the substantive and the attribute is 'conjunction'. In this cognition, silver's characteristic of being an attribute correlates with the man's characteristic of being a substantive. That is, silver's 'attribute-ness' is conditioned by the man's 'substantive-ness'; the 'substantive-ness' is delimited by 'man-ness'. This cognition in which silver's 'attribute-ness' is conditioned by 'substantive-ness' delimited by 'man-ness' effects fruitful activity such as the apprehender's approaching the man and receiving the silver. 'Attribute-ness' and 'substantive-ness' are, as seen on pages 69 and 70, forms of 'object-ness'; 'object-ness' is a 'self-linking relation' through which an object becomes linked with knowledge.

Now, consider that there is the knowledge of a shell at hand as 'this' and the recollection of silver. When there is the non-discrimination between the two apprehensions, silver's 'object-ness' correlates with (the shell's) 'object-ness' delimited by 'this-ness'. However, when there is awareness of the distinction, there can be no such correlation.]

Reply: Non-discrimination is admitted for accounting through a common specification the initiation of activity in cases where

there is no error and where there is error. As in the case of an error-free cognition of a substantive with an attribute, the cognition with error that initiates activity is such that silver's 'object-ness' is conditioned by the 'object-ness' of what is delimited by 'this-ness'. When the distinction between the two cognitions (one, perception and the other, recollection) is known, there cannot be any 'conditioner-conditioned' relationship between the 'object-ness' of what is delimited by 'this-ness' and the 'object-ness' of silver.

Objection: The subsequent knowledge, "This is not silver" cannot annul the two earlier cognitions, as it is not contrary to either of them. So, the perception of what is in front as 'this' and the recollection of silver can continue. Therefore, activity to take possession of what is in front can occur even after the dawn of the knowledge, "This is not silver."

Reply: It is to ward off such an objection that it was said earlier that the non-discrimination between what is at hand (the shell) and what is desired (the silver that is recollected) is the cause of activity (to acquire the object in front). When the knowledge, "This is not silver" is present, the discrimination between what is at hand and what is desired is decidedly there. As the cause, non-discrimination, is absent, the activity (to acquire the object in front) does not occur.

It is said in the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*, "But some others say that the superimposition of one thing on another is the delusion arising from the non-apprehension of their distinctness." Here, 'non-discrimination of their distinctness' refers to 'the non-discrimination between the substratum and what is superimposed and between the perception of the substratum and the recollection of what is superimposed'. With reference to the shell-silver example, 'the delusion arising from non-discrimination' means the specific usage, "This is silver." Thus, the sentence conveys: Some others, the Prābhākara-s, say that the superimposition of silver upon the shell is the specific usage,

"This is silver" arising from the non-discrimination between the substratum (the 'this' aspect of the shell) and what is superimposed (the silver) and between the perception of the substratum (as 'this') and the recollection (as 'silver').

[Various objections had been raised against the possibility of the false superimposition of the non-Self on the Self. It had also been contended that false superimposition is unproved by any means of valid knowledge and that it is undefined. All the objections have been refuted, evidence for false superimposition furnished and precise definitions given. The purpose of presenting the different theories of error thereafter is only to show that they are not antithetical to the basic definition of false superimposition given in the *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya*. After succinctly referring to how the various schools define superimposition, Bhagavatpāda writes, "From every point of view, however, there is no difference as regards the appearance of one thing as something else. And this is our experience in the world: a shell appears as if it were silver; the moon though one appears as if having a second."

The text of *Jīvanmuktabhāratī* ends here.]

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